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Resumo 
 
Esta dissertação centra a investigação sobre a questão de saber se as sanções económicas 
representam um instrumento eficaz no sentido de impedir o Irão de desenvolver actividades 
nucleares ilegais. O objectivo da pesquisa consiste igualmente em avaliar as consequências 
reais das sanções económicas para cada um dos Estados-Membros da União Europeia (UE), 
bem como outros Estados na cena internacional — sendo a eficácia das sanções avaliada 
com a ajuda de variáveis políticas e económicas.  
A pesquisa inclui informações detalhadas sobre o perfil político do Irão, sobre as relações 
comerciais entre a UE e o Irão, sobre o programa nuclear iraniano e sobre as sanções 
impostas ao Irão. O trabalho extrai um certo número de resultados relevantes, onde se inclui 
o facto de que Irão tem o apoio de várias superpotências na cena internacional, e o facto 
segundo o qual os países da UE os mais envolvidos nas relações comerciais com o Irão são 
igualmente os mais afectados pela crise global internacional.  
As principais conclusões a retirar do estudo apontam para a ideia de que as sanções contra o 
Irão foram até agora ineficazes, na medida em que a possessão da arma nuclear é para o 
Irão mais prioritária do que a própria saúde económica do país. O estudo demonstra 
igualmente que as consequências das sanções para cada um dos Estados-Membros da UE 
provocam dificuldades acrescidas para encontrar novos parceiros comerciais. As sanções 
aplicadas teriam sido menos destrutivas se fossem impostas antes da crise económica global 
que afecta a maioria dos Estados-Membros da UE devido às dependências no comércio, e 
em particular a dependência das trocas com o Irão relativas ao petróleo.  
 
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, Irão, Comércio internacional, Sanções económicas.  
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation focuses on investigating if economic sanctions represent an efficient tool 
that could manage to impair Iran`s illegal nuclear activities, as well as on researching the 
real consequences that the economic sanctions bring for individual European Union (EU) 
members and other relevant countries on the international scene. The efficiency of 
sanctions has been evaluated with the help of certain political and economic variables.  
The research includes detailed information on Iran`s political background, on EU`s trade 
relation with Iran, on Iran`s nuclear program and on sanctions imposed on Iran. The 
research produces a number of key findings, including the fact that Iran enjoys the support 
of several influential superpowers on the international scene, and that EU countries most 
involved in trade with Iran are the ones most affected by the global economic crises.  
The main conclusions drawn from this research are that the sanctions on Iran were so far 
not efficient, because Iran`s possession of a nuclear weapon is more a priority to the 
country than its economic health. The research also shows that the consequences for 
individual EU members bring trouble in finding new trade partners, and would be less 
harmful if imposed before the global economic crises that most affects the EU members 
that are dependent on trade, and in particular oil trade, with Iran. 
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Résumé 
 
Ce mémoire aborde la question de savoir si les sanctions économiques représentent un 
instrument efficace pour empêcher l'Iran de développer des activités nucléaires illégales. 
L'étude vise également à évaluer les conséquences réelles des sanctions économiques pour 
chacun des États membres de l'Union européenne (UE), mais aussi pour d'autres États sur la 
scène internationale — l'efficacité des sanctions étant évaluée à l'aide de variables 
économiques et politiques. 
La recherche comprend des informations détaillées sur le profil politique de l'Iran, sur les 
relations commerciales entre l'UE et l'Iran, sur le programme nucléaire iranien et sur les 
sanctions imposées à l'Iran. Le travail inspire d'un certain nombre de résultats pertinents, 
notamment le fait que l'Iran a le soutien de plusieurs grandes puissances sur la scène 
internationale et le fait que les pays de l'UE les plus impliqués dans le commerce avec l'Iran 
sont aussi ceux les plus touchés par la crise mondiale. 
Les principales conclusions à tirer de l'étude soulignent l'idée que les sanctions contre l'Iran 
sont restées jusqu'ici sans effets majeurs, dans la mesure où la possession de l'arme 
nucléaires est pour l’Iran plus prioritaire que la santé économique du pays. L'étude montre 
aussi que les conséquences des sanctions pour chacun des États membres de l’UE 
conduisent à des difficultés accrues pour trouver de nouveaux partenaires commerciaux. 
Les sanctions appliquées auraient été moins nocives si elles avaient été imposées avant la 
crise économique qui touche la majorité des membres États membres de l'UE du fait de leur 
dépendance commerciale et en particulier de la dépendance relative au commerce du 
pétrole avec l'Iran. 
 
Mots-clés: Union européenne, Iran, Commerce international, Sanctions économiques. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“European Union position is based on the firm belief that an Iran with nuclear weapons 
risks triggering a proliferation cascade throughout Middle East. This is the last thing that 
this region needs. A nuclear weapons–free Middle East remains a European goal” (Ashton, 
2010). The EU has a clear stand toward a development of nuclear weapon in Iran. It has 
made many diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from such actions however they have shown 
no success. Iran has tricked EU and the whole international community several times by 
concluding agreements that were very soon breached. Ever since 2003, IAEA (International 
Atomic Energy Agency) has had doubts about the character of Iran`s nuclear program as 
well as about the honesty of Iran`s cooperation with IAEA (Farrar–Wellman, 2010). 
However the first more serious actions by the EU3 (France, Germany and United 
Kingdom(UK)) were proposed only in 2009 and even than not all the EU members agreed 
on such actions (Dinmore, Bozorgmehr & Barker, 2009). Only in 2012, EU finally decided 
to unilaterally impose stricter economic sanctions. The part that most affected Iran was the 
EU ban on the importation, purchase and transportation of Iranian crude oil, since the 27 
members account for about 20% of Iran`s oil exports (BBC News, 2012). Iran is a very 
controversial country and has because of its actions problems in relations with several 
countries in the international community. It also has a history which shows that its disputes 
rarely come to a conclusion. Whether the economic sanctions have any potential for 
success, what changes will they bring for the relevant countries in the international 
community and how will they affect the EU members, are the areas that I will research in 
this thesis. 
 
The aim is to form a thesis that will show some new conclusions on the consequences that 
the EU economic sanctions against Iran bring. The added value of this thesis is a different 
perspective on the influence of economic sanctions. The research will include the 
implications for both sides, but the main focus will be on the consequences the economic 
sanctions have for the sender. I believe this perspective is less common in research, since 
the sanctions are aimed to harm the target country. However they usually also have bad 
implications for the sender if they are not imposed right. The sanctions bring a lot of 
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changes and I believe, since this is a very recent set of actions, there is not much academic 
literature that has been written on the consequences that these sanctions will cause for EU 
and other members of the international community. Therefore my research will more 
extensively explore also this dimension. This topic is relevant for the current and the future 
relations between EU and Iran and also for the situation in the whole international 
community. Iran is a very difficult partner to work with and its nuclear program brings 
worries for everyone. Therefore it deserves a lot of attention and a better understanding of 
the main problems and implications it brings for everyone in the international community. 
 
— Subject of the dissertation 
 
The main subject of research of this dissertation will be the connection among the relations 
Iran–EU and the consequences that these relations bring. The importance will be given on 
the position of EU in the international community and the changes it can cause with its 
behavior. I will investigate the changes that the economic sanctions imposed on Iran bring 
for individual members of EU that have an established trade relations with Iran; the 
changes that other relevant countries in the international community will have to meet; the 
efficiency of sanctions; rationality; and timing of the economic sanctions and the cost of 
these sanctions for everyone involved. Special focus will be given on the development of 
the nuclear program, EU`s involvement in negotiations with Iran, the power that the 
imposed economic sanctions really have on Iran, and the consequences they bring for EU. 
 
The objective is to investigate if economic sanctions represent an efficient form of 
measures that could manage to impair Iran`s illegal nuclear activities. The second objective 
of the dissertation is to discover through detail analyses the real consequences that the 
economic sanctions bring for individual EU members and other relevant countries in the 
international community. 
 
When writing about the development of Iran as a country my research will be limited to the 
time period between 1990 and 2012, because this is the period important for the 
understanding of how it all came to the start of Iran`s illegal nuclear activities. A special 
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emphasizes will be given on the present time and the rule of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who is 
the main person responsible for all the tensions between EU and Iran. The objective of the 
dissertation is not the in-depth analyses of Iran history, the relevance for my research 
begins with the nuclear program which lead to conflicts. The analyses of EU sanction 
documentation on Iran will be limited up to December 2012, and any further Decisions and 
Regulations of the Council of EU are not included in this thesis. 
 
— Hypothesis and research questions  
 
EU has had problems with Iran`s moody behavior for a while before it decided to take 
further measures. They first started with diplomatic negotiations that lasted too long and 
had no efficient outcome. When the EU decided to take further measures and impose 
economic sanctions, the world was already facing the global economic crises. These 
sanctions bring consequences not only for Iran but also for several actors involved, such as 
EU members and other closely connected countries with Iran and EU. 
 
Therefore my hypotheses are as follows:  
 
First, the political and economic costs for Iran, caused by the EU sanctions, will not be 
greater than the political and security costs of complying with EU`s demands, and 
therefore the sanctions will not be efficient; 
 
Second, the EU economic sanctions on Iran bring additional difficulties and 
insecurities for EU members as well as for other countries in the international 
community, because they were set up in the wrong time period. 
 
The research questions that will help to investigate the second hypothesis more in detail 
are: How will the economic sanctions influence on individual EU members and their 
economies in a time of financial crises? What will be the consequences of these economic 
sanctions for other relevant countries in international community? 
 
4 
 
— Research methodology 
 
In order to answer my research questions and hypothesis I will use the following 
methodological tools; the analysis and interpretation of primary and secondary sources that 
will be used in all the chapters. In the first chapter, I will use the conceptual analysis as a 
type of description method, which will help me define the main concepts on which the 
dissertation is based and of which explanation is important for a better understanding of the 
whole content of the work. The description method will be used to explain the main 
variables, which are political and economic. These variables will be taken from the book 
Economic Sanction Reconsidered by the authors Hufabuer et al., and their description is 
crucial since they represent the criteria and basis for the evaluation and analyses of 
economic sanctions imposed against Iran. I have chosen variables from this specific book, 
because they are in my opinion most suitable for the case I am analyzing.  
 
A brief explanation of Iranian political system will be made, including the main political 
institutions, in order to have a better understanding about the functioning of their political 
system. This part will be formed with the description method. The relevant books and 
online articles will be used. 
 
Partly historical development analyses and partly the description method will be the 
methods of research that will help me explain the political and economic development of 
Iran in the time period from 1990 until 2012. The nuclear program development will be 
introduced using the description method in combination with a case study approach. In this 
sequence the main resources used for the historical development will be the existing books 
on Iran`s development and also online academic articles. For the explanation of Iran`s 
nuclear development, primary resources such as Resolutions of United Nations (UN) 
Security Council and interpretation of the latest information, which I will get from reliable 
sources such as BBC, CNN, Reuters will be used. 
 
In Chapter III, where the EU–Iran relations and their fields of economic cooperation will be 
presented, I will use the analyses and interpretation of the newspaper articles, EU 
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publications and various online resources that provide up-to-date information as well as 
books and surveys that have been written and which will give me more information about 
the development of these relations. When analyzing the concrete economic sanctions that 
EU imposed on Iran, the interpretation of primary resources, such as Resolutions of UN 
Security Council and Council of the EU Decisions and Positions as well as other important 
documents will also be included.  
 
For the purpose of my research I will use the non-participant observation methods, because 
I will focus my research mainly on the analyses of existing literature, documents and 
complete it with my critical thinking. 
 
— Structure of the research 
 
The dissertation is divided on three main chapters: in the first chapter the theoretical or 
background concepts will be defined such as what are the economic sanctions, what types 
there are, what are the reasons for the use of economic sanctions and a more detailed 
explanation of embargo which is the main type of economic sanctions imposed against Iran. 
In this part also the variables that affect on the outcome of sanctions will be defined, they 
are divided on political and economic variables. These variables are important for the 
further analyses of the efficiency of economic sanctions.  
 
The second chapter of the dissertation involves the description and review of the main 
relations and events that occur and are important for the analyses. First an explanation of 
the Iranian political system and its main political organs will be made. This will serve for a 
better understanding of the functioning of the political system in Iran. Next a political and 
economic background of Iran’s development through the years 1990 until 2012 will be 
made. I will explain how the country evolved, what changes and problems it faced and a 
special focus will be given on the presidency of the latest president Ahmadinejad. Further 
on I will write about the nuclear program in Iran, how it came to the start of the nuclear 
activities, how the nuclear program developed and what was the reaction of the 
international community on their illegal nuclear activities. 
6 
 
 
In the following chapter the relations between Iran and EU will be described. Here the 
importance will be given on the development of their cooperation, the main sectors of trade, 
the beginning of tensions and the economic sanctions imposed. Information on bilateral 
trade relations among individual relevant EU members and Iran will also be included. The 
third chapter also includes critical analyses of the consequences and possible outcomes of 
the economic sanctions imposed. According to the economic and political variables, which 
were defined in the first chapter of this thesis, an assessment of efficiency of the economic 
sanctions imposed by EU will be made. I will continue with the implications of the 
sanctions for the individual EU members that have closest economic relations with Iran. 
Further on also the considerations of the consequences for other countries involved will be 
made.  
 
In the final division of the work I will set down my conclusions. Basing on my analysis and 
interpretation of all the gathered information I will accept or reject my hypothesis and 
answer the research questions. I will try to expose the questions that are still unresolved and 
that could be a basis for a future research on the topic. 
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CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS 
 
The main concept studied in the thesis is the concept of economic sanctions. Over the years 
different authors made various interpretations about what economic sanctions are. The 
interpretations mostly differ in the means used and the goals they want to achieve. One of 
the most used definitions of economic sanctions was introduced by Johan Galtung. 
Economic sanctions according to his interpretation are defined as actions initiated by one or 
more international actors, which are called the senders, against one or more others, which 
are called the receivers. These actions can happen for one or both of the two purposes: to 
punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply 
with certain norms the senders deep important (Galtung, 1967, p. 379). 
 
Baldwin (1985, p. 35) identifies three meanings of economic sanctions. First interpretation 
states the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The second refers to the 
types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented in the target state. And the 
third form of interpreting economic sanctions corresponds to the concept of economic 
techniques of statecraft. However he is critical of the first two definitions saying that the 
first definition is to narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy 
analyses and the second puts more focus on the intended effects of economic sanctions 
rather than on means to achieve this effects.  
 
Hufbauer et al. (2009, p. 3) define economic sanctions as deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations. In this case 
the term customary means levels of trade and financial activity that would probably have 
occurred in the absence of sanctions. Economic sanctions are also understood as the 
economic foreign policy instrument of countries and international organizations, which are 
in the first place meant to achieve non–economic goals. They usually have a negative 
aspect, since they represent a form of punishment for a certain unwanted behavior, but there 
are also positive forms of economic sanctions, that can be applied to change the behavior of 
another country (Udovič, 2009, p. 49). 
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Use of economic sanctions under the international law is defined in article 41 of the Charter 
of the United Nations that states the following:  
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
 
In order to better understand the context of economic sanctions it is important to explain 
their place in foreign policy of states. States and other subjects in international 
community use foreign policy to achieve their goals and interests in the international 
environment. To achieve these foreign policy goals they use foreign policy tools (Petrič, 
2010, p. 344). These tools are economic measures, political measures and military 
measures or measures of using force (Benko cit. in Udovič, 2009, p. 33). Each foreign 
policy tool has its internal and external limitations. External limitations usually derive 
from international law and internal limitations are dependent on public opinion and state 
laws (id., p. 32).  
 
Foreign policy tools can be separated on direct and indirect tools of foreign policy. 
Direct are those that are used in foreign policy and diplomacy in order to achieve 
concrete foreign policy goals. Indirect are those that express the position of a state in the 
international community, such as for example membership in international organizations 
(Petrič, 2010, pp. 344–361).  
 
Economic sanctions are a part of economic measures that are a direct tool of foreign 
policy. Economic measures can be very different. Most often used are economic 
sanctions as a form of negative measures and Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
as a form of positive sanctions (Udovič, 2009, p. 49). Economic sanctions are used very 
often as complement to or a substitute for other measures such as diplomatic or military 
measures in order to make them more effective (Benko, 1997, p. 266).  
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1. Types of economic sanctions 
 
Economic sanctions can work best if they are selected and applied considering the 
profile of the target state. Actors in international community use different types of 
economic sanctions that can be classified according to their focus. According to the 
contents of sanctions we can separate between trade and financial sanctions. The country 
can influence on behavior of another country either with positive sanctions that means 
with rewarding, or by negative sanctions, which is with punishment. Depending on how 
many states are involved we can separate between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. 
And according to the extent of sanctions there are selective sanctions and general 
sanctions. In this subchapter the latter types of economic sanctions will be revised. 
 
1.1. Sanctions as to their contents 
 
— Trade sanctions 
 
Trade sanctions impose measures such as limitation of exports and restriction of imports 
that cause for the target country lost of export markets, denial of critical imports, lower 
prices received for embargoed exports, and higher prices paid for substitute imports 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 44–45). Countries that carry out sanctions more often use 
export controls than import controls. This happens because the sender countries are more 
likely to enjoy a dominant market position as suppliers of key exports. And considering 
imports there are probably many alternative purchasers of imports (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, pp. 91–92). The problem of trade sanctions is that the consequences, especially 
from export controls, mostly affect the population of the target country (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, p. 97). 
 
Limitations of exports are referred as embargo. Embargo is a prohibition on exports 
from the targeted country and can sometimes be used to refer to a ban on all trade 
(Baldwin, 1985, p. 41). It will be explained more in detail further on.  Prohibition on 
imports or boycott means to use different measures that prevent the imports of certain 
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goods from the target country to the country that imposes sanctions. Countries use 
boycott as a reaction on certain policy or measures of other country, with which they do 
not agree. Sometimes it is an action caused by the public, citizens as a consequence of 
disliking or reluctance of a certain country from where a product originates. The 
problem of boycott is that it brings also negative consequences for the country that 
imposes it and its citizens, and it is difficult to hold a boycott for a longer time (Petrič, 
2010, pp. 381–382). 
 
— Financial sanctions 
 
Financial sanctions can cause for the targeted country interruption of foreign assistance 
or other official finance, delaying or denying credits or grants and less often with 
restrictions on private lending or investment. They can be used alone but are usually 
used in combination with trade sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 46). The most 
common financial sanctions are the interruption of official development assistance 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 96). 
 
The impact of financial sanctions on political balance of the target country can 
sometimes be stronger than the sender country aims it to be. Financial sanctions have 
more potential to influence on the government officials that can influence of policy. 
Financial sanctions can also interrupt a wide range of trade flows even without the 
presence of explicit trade sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 97).  
 
— Asset freezes 
 
Hufbauer et al. mention also a third form of sanctions which is asset freezes.  This is 
considered a financial sanction but since it has impacts both on trade and financial 
aspects it is mentioned separately. A broad freeze of assets not only stops financial flows 
but also affects on trade, though freezes are often imposed together with broad trade 
controls. The target country can become very vulnerable if the assets such as 
merchandise, bank accounts and account receivable of the country, its corporations and 
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residents is frozen. Usually asset freezes were used during war times, however recently 
they are used in case of drug traffickers or terrorists (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 96). Asset 
freezes are becoming more popular also as means of targeting the leaders of the rogue 
regimes, corrupt autocrats, and their associates (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 63).  
 
1.2. Unilateral and multilateral sanctions 
 
— Unilateral economic sanctions 
  
Depending on how many countries impose economic sanctions we can talk about 
unilateral or multilateral sanctions. Unilateral economic sanctions are measures imposed 
only by one country. In most cases states that decide for unilateral sanctions are 
economic superpowers that have a certain power and influence in the international 
community (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 111). The success of unilateral sanctions depends 
on the degree of dependence by the target country on the country imposing the 
sanctions, and on the speed and ease with which the target country can alter that 
dependency (Cortright & Lopez, 1995, p. 19). 
 
— Multilateral economic sanctions 
 
Multilateral economic sanctions can be explained as sanctions that are imposed by two 
or more countries. In most cases one state is the leading sender of sanctions and he needs 
to establish a credible commitment to these sanctions in order to convince other states to 
cooperate (Martin, 1961, p. 12). 
 
Multilateral economic sanctions are most commonly imposed in a framework of a 
certain international organization. UN Security Council with its decisions is responsible 
in most cases for the approval of multilateral economic sanctions. If the UN Security 
Council imposes economic sanctions against a country all the members of UN are 
obliged to perform them. The same rule is in force in the EU and NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization). However the measures imposed by international organizations 
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have to be first accepted by the member states, as determined in each charter of an 
organization (Petrič, 2010, pp. 346–348). International organizations tie together a 
number of issues and provide for its members specific benefits. Therefore it can also 
facilitate the construction of linkages for a certain leading state that wants to impose 
sanctions (Martin, 1961, p. 12). 
 
1.3. Negative and positive sanctions 
 
Baldwin (1985, pp. 41–42) in his book Economic Statecraft separates economic 
sanctions on positive and negative. All of the mentioned sanctions in this chapter are 
nominated under the international law and are used in agreements, declarations and 
treaties as well as in the Charter of UN (Udovič, 2009, p. 49).  
 
— Negative sanctions 
 
Negative sanctions are based on threats and punishment for a certain unwanted behavior 
and actions of another country. Forms of negative economic sanctions are: 
 
(a) Trade sanctions, namely 
 
- Embargo;  
- Boycott; 
- Tariff increase, i.e. the increase in taxes on imports from target state; 
- Tariff discrimination, i.e. the fact that imports from target country may be 
treated less favorably than those from other countries;  
- Withdrawal of “most favored nation” treatment, i.e. ceasing to treat imports 
from a country as similar imports from any other country treated;  
- Blacklist, i.e. the ban on doing business with firms that trade with the target 
country; 
- Quotas, i.e. quantitative restrictions on particular imports or exports;  
- License denial, i.e. refusing permission to import or export particular goods.  
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- Dumping, i.e. the deliberate sale of exports at prices below cost of 
production; 
- Preclusive buying, i.e. the purchase of a commodity in order to deny it to the 
target country; 
- Threats of the above — making use of any of the above techniques 
conditional on certain kinds of behavior by the target.  
 
(b) Capital sanctions, namely 
 
- Freezing assets, i.e. impounding assets, denying access to bank accounts or other 
financial assets owned by the target country; 
- Controls on import or export, i.e. restrictions on who can transfer how much capital 
for what purposes into or out of the country; 
- Aid suspension, i.e. the reduction, termination, or slow–down of aid transfers; 
- Expropriation, i.e. seizing ownership of property belonging to target state; 
- Taxation, i.e. assets of target state may be taxed in a discriminatory manner; 
- Withholding dues to international organizations, i.e. nonpayment, late payment, or 
reduced payment of financial obligations agreed to in the past; 
- Threats of the above. 
 
— Positive sanctions 
 
Positive sanctions aim to achieve the change in the behavior of another state with promises 
or providing rewards. Forms of positive economic sanctions are: 
 
(a) Trade sanctions, namely 
 
- Tariff discrimination, i.e. import duties favoring imports from target state; 
- Granting “most–favored nation” treatment–promising to treat imports from target 
state as favorably as imports of similar products from any other country; 
- Tariff reduction, i.e. lowering of tariffs in general or on particular products; 
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- Direct purchase, i.e. payment for service or goods; 
- Subsidies to exports or imports, i.e. exports to or imports from the target state may 
be subsidized. 
- Granting licenses, i.e. permission to import or export particular goods; 
- Promises of the above. 
 
(b) Capital sanctions, namely 
 
- Providing aid, i.e. extension or continuation of aid or multilateral channels in the 
form of grant or loans; 
- Investment guarantees, i.e. governmental insurance against some of the risks of 
private foreign investors; 
- Encouragement of private capital exports or imports, i.e. variety of incentives to 
import or export capital; 
- Taxation, i.e. especially favorable taxation of foreign capital investment; 
- Promises of the above.  
 
2. Embargo 
 
The purpose of embargo, as a type of economic sanction, is to prevent that the country 
against which the embargo is targeted at gets certain goods and products. Embargo can be 
imposed by one country or by a group of countries, a regional organization or UN. It is 
usually difficult for only one country to impose an effective embargo and prevent the 
access to certain goods and products to a certain country against which the embargo is 
imposed. An effective embargo can be alone carried out only by superpowers, if they get 
the cooperation of other countries, usually neighbors of the country under embargo. More 
often, than by an individual country, is embargo imposed by an international organization. 
Embargo includes usually only certain products or goods for example arms or technological 
items. However embargo even if imposed by the UN is very often breached, because the 
illegal trade with arms is a very profitable part of economic activities (Petrič, 2010, pp. 
380–381). 
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Embargo is mainly put in place by the UN and the EU. The main aim of UN embargoes is, 
as stated in the UN Charter, to implement decisions by the Security Council to maintain or 
restore international peace and security. On the other side EU imposes embargoes for the 
purposes of its Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives (Business Link, ND). The 
aims are to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to promote international 
co-operation and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (Council of the European Union, ND). 
 
Embargo can be either temporary or permanent. However in most cases embargo is only a 
temporary measure (Brown & Sadler, 2012, p. 1). Embargo can also be selective or 
comprehensive depending on how many areas it covers (Tostensen & Bull 2002, p. 374). 
 
3. Change in economic sanctions 
 
After 1990, a certain shift from comprehensive sanctions to targeted and selective 
sanctions has occurred as a response to bad consequences that comprehensive sanctions 
caused and in order make sanctions more effective. Comprehensive economic sanctions 
cause great humanitarian damage since they impact most the innocent and vulnerable 
populations, and not so much the political elites where the real policy changes can occur 
(Cortright & Lopez, 2002, p. 2). In some cases regime leaders and their loyal supporters 
escape practically unharmed (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 138). Especially the UN 
experiences with sanctions against Iraq and Haiti that caused great collateral damage to 
ordinary civilians started the search for better options. The goal has therefore become to 
find methods of economic pressure that can more effectively convince elites to change 
objectionable policies (Cortright & Lopez, 2002, p. 2).  
 
This led to the formation of “smart sanctions”. Smart sanctions differ from conventional 
sanctions in two ways: they more effectively target and penalize political elites and they 
protect the vulnerable social groups such as women, children, and elderly from collateral 
damage by exempting specified commodities, such as food and medical supplies, from 
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the embargo (Totensen & Bull, 2002, pp. 373–374). Smart sanctions are designed to 
apply maximum pressure on the culpable actors while at the same time minimizing the 
adverse humanitarian impacts (Taylor, 2010, p. 23). They are targeted and selective. 
Targeting focuses coercive pressure on those responsible for wrongdoing, while 
minimizing unintended negative impacts. Targeting also means selectively sanctioning 
specific products or activities that are important and valuable for the decision makers 
(Cortright & Lopez, 2002, p. 2). Smart sanctions usually come in the form of arms 
embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and selective banking sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, p. 138).  
 
4. Variables that affect sanctions 
 
The variables that affect economic sanctions are very important because they influence 
on the outcome and consequences. The variables will help me evaluate if the economic 
sanctions imposed by EU can stop Iran. In this chapter the variables will be defined and 
explained. I will rely on the variables determined by the authors Hufbauer et al. that 
have made a research about sanctions and their effects in their book Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered (2009). The variables will be divided on political and economic. Some 
alterations and adjustments have been made to these variables in order to best fit the 
analysis of this dissertation.  
 
4.1. Political variables 
 
This includes: 
 
— Companion Policy Measures 
Companion policy measures are imposed if economic sanctions don`t have enough 
influence on the target. They serve as additional measures. We can distinguish three 
types of companion policies: covert action; quasi–military action and regular military 
action.  Covert action is often used when the destabilization of a target government is 
sought. Quasi–military force may be imposed where major policy changes are sought, as 
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for example massing troops at the boarder or stationing war vessels off the coast. 
Economic sanctions may also be accompanied with actual armed hostility when using 
regular military action (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 57). 
 
— International cooperation 
In order to make economic sanctions successful, an international cooperation has to be 
established between the leading country and the other actors. The aim is to deny the 
target country access to suppliers or markets of its target partners. For the sender country 
more cooperation is always better that less, however the critical variable that influences 
on the amount of cooperation is usually the nature of the objective (Hufbauer et al., 
2009, pp. 57–59).  
 
— International Assistance to the Target Country 
The support offered to the target country is the opposite side of the international 
cooperation working with the sender country. Target countries are very rarely 
completely isolated and abandoned by all the markets and financial sources when 
economic sanctions are imposed. The impact of economic sanctions can be reduced if 
the target countries have friends that offer them support and help them compensate for 
the burdens imposed by sanctions. It can happen that target countries turn sanctions to 
their economic advantage if they cooperate with the opponents of the sender country 
(Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 59–60). 
 
— Prior Relations between Sender and Target Country 
The degree of sanctions depends on the relations between the sender and the target 
country. With friends, subtle or symbolic sanctions may succeed. A friendly country will 
consider the relation it has with the sender country before it responds. On the other side 
with belligerent countries forceful sanctions may be needed. For the classification of 
prior relations between the sender and the target the following index will be used: 
 
- Antagonistic: the sender and the target countries are in opposing camps; 
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- Neutral: the sender country does not have strongly connected relations with the 
target, but there is a workable relationship without antagonism; 
 
- Cordial: the sender and the target countries are close friends and allies (Hufbauer 
et al., 2009, pp. 60–61).  
 
— Political Regime of the Target Country 
Determining whether the system is democratic, autocratic or has dimensions of both, 
depends on certain indicators such as the institutionalized competitiveness of political 
participation, the regulation of political participation, the openness and competitiveness 
of executive recruitment and the institutional constrains on the exercise of executive 
power (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 61). 
 
4.2. Economic Variables 
 
This includes:  
 
— The size of the sender and target country 
The outcome of sanctions may also be influenced by the relative size of the sender and 
the target country. Usually the sender country should be larger and its GDP should be 
bigger than in the target country in order to make sanctions really effective (Hufbauer et 
al., 2009, p. 62).  
 
— The trade linkages 
The sender countries are usually very large economies and the target`s import and export 
trade with the sender normally accounts for over 10% of the target`s total external 
commerce. This way an interruption in trade, even in a very small portion, can cause 
unpleasant consequences for the target country (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 90).  
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— The types of sanctions used 
Success of the type of sanctions used may depend on whether the sanctions hit a 
sensitive sector in the target country. If an authoritarian government controls the target 
country, the impact of sanctions will be weakened because the elite usually shift the 
burden of sanctions to the general population. The formation of economic sanctions 
needs to be done very carefully because the specific measures will differently affect also 
home firms and communities (Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 90–91).  
 
— The economic health and political stability of target country 
The economic and political atmosphere also influences on the sanctions imposed and its 
outcome. The judgment scale that will be used to evaluate the environment that the 
target government is facing: 
 
- Distress: a country with acute economic problems, which is seen by high 
unemployment and rampant inflation, as well as with political unrest that borders 
on chaos; 
 
- Significant problems: a country that faces severe economic problems in the form 
of foreign exchange crisis, coupled with substantial internal dissent; 
 
- Strong and stable: a country with the government in firm control and with 
economy that faces only the normal range of inflation, unemployment and 
similar ills (Hufbauer et al. 2009, pp. 62–63). 
 
— The estimating costs of sanctions to the target countries 
Economic costs, both to the sender and to the target, help determine the success or 
failure of the imposed sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 101). The higher the net cost 
to the target, the more likely they will alter its policies. The estimated costs will be 
related to the change in the GDP of the target country (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 62). 
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CHAPTER II. IRAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
Iran`s political system is the factor that has a great influence on its behavior. The influence 
of each political institution within the country depends on the political orientation of most 
members. Currently the most influential coalition are the radical group, which have the 
support of the Supreme leader, the Guardian Council, have most of the seats in the 
Parliament and also the current president Ahmadinejad belongs to this coalition. The 
political and economic development of Iran has been much influenced by different political 
coalitions that were ruling the country throughout the past.  
 
Ever since 2002 there have been serious doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran`s nuclear 
program (Federal Foreign Office, 2012b). Because of these suspicions several members of 
international community proposed diplomatic measures in which they would help Iran 
develop a modern civil nuclear power program and try to solve the problem with different 
proposals (Farrar–Wellman, 2010). However Iran refused the offers and continued with 
building new enrichment plants. UN Security Council has issued a number of Resolutions 
that are legally binding and that are suppose to make Iran comply with the IAEA demands 
on peaceful use of nuclear program (Federal Foreign Office, 2012b).  
 
In chapter two the main topic will be the political and economic development of Iran, and 
the start of the nuclear program. In order to understand Iran`s behavior and actions, this 
second chapter will also revise Iran`s political system and its main political institutions. 
 
1. Iran political system 
 
Iran is located in the Middle East and shares boarders with seven countries: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and Turkmenistan. With its 1,648,195 
sq km it is the 18 largest country in the world (CIA, 2012). Iran income level is ranked 
according to the World Bank to the upper middle income. Its GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) has in 2009 reached $331. 0 billion (The World Bank, 2012), and the real GDP 
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growth in 2011 was 2%, which is almost 4% less than in 2010 when it reached 5, 9% 
(International Monetary Fund 2012, p. 72). The main problem of Iran`s GDP is the high 
dependence on oil and very low non–oil GDP growth. The problem that also troubles the 
country’s economy is the high inflation (Tehran Times, 2010).  
 
In 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran was established with a theocratic system of 
government. The political system is a mix of appointed and directly elected institutions 
(Aljazeera, 2009). The main political institutions are: Supreme leader; the President; 
Assembly of Experts; Expediency Council; Guardian Council; Islamic Consultative 
Assembly; Supreme Court and the Council of the Judiciary (CIA, 2012).  
 
1.1. The Supreme leader 
 
The Supreme leader represents the highest ranking political and religious authority in the 
country. His role is to appoint chiefs of posts such as the commanders of the armed 
forces, chief judges, prosecutors and also the six Islamic jurists of the Guardian Council 
(Aljazeera, 2009). Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the current Supreme leader of Iran since 
1989 and he has constitutional authority over all the branches: executive, legislative, 
judicial, and he also influences on the military and media (United States Institute of 
Peace, NDc). In domestic politics he represents the mediator in the competing themes of 
republicanism and theocracy. However the current Supreme leader leans toward a more 
conservative ideological stance (Green, Wehrey & Wolf, 2009, p. 8). His performance is 
monitored by the Assembly of Experts (Aljazeera, 2009). 
 
1.2. The President 
 
The President of Iran is, since 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. He is the Head of 
government and oversees economic policy and the management of national affairs, 
selects the Council of Ministers, chairs the national Security Council and signs 
agreements with foreign governments (Aljazeera, 2009). He represents the executive 
branch together with the Supreme leader and the Council of Ministers. The Council of 
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Ministers is appointed by the president with the approval of the legislative branch (CIA, 
2012). The President does not have any authority over the armed forces and security 
forces. He is elected by popular vote, but his acceptability has to be confirmed by the 
Supreme leader (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, pp. 12–13). 
 
1.3. The Assembly of Experts 
 
It is the only body that can appoint and dismiss the Supreme leader. It is considered 
together with Expediency Council and Guardian Council a part of the oversight bodies 
of the executive branch. The members are popularly elected every 8 years (United States 
Institute of Peace, NDa). Even though it is an elected body, with each province choosing 
a number of representatives according to its population, the Guardian Council must vet 
all the candidates (Crane, Lal & Martini 2008, p. 11).  
 
1.4. The Expediency Council 
 
It represents a council appointed by the Supreme leader (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 
12). It is the supervisory authority over the executive, judicial and legislative branches, it 
also resolves issues and differences that the Council of Guardians and the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly (the Parliament) may face (CIA, 2012). The body was 
established by the Supreme leader in 1988 in order to reduce the power of conservatives 
in the Guardian Council. It has weakened the ability of the Guardian Council to reject 
law passes by the Parliament at will (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 12). 
 
1.5. The Guardian Council 
 
The Council consists of 12 jurists (Crane, Lal & Martini 2008, p. 11), and it has the 
constitutional authority to veto parliamentary decisions and vet electoral candidates. It 
determines whether proposed legislation is both constitutional and faithful to Islamic law 
and also supervises national elections. It is an unelected body, half are appointed by the 
23 
 
Supreme leader and the rest by the Parliament (CIA, 2012). The member of the Council 
can serve for six terms (Crane, Lal & Martini 2008, p. 11).  
 
1.6. The Islamic Consultative Assembly 
 
Islamic Consultative Assembly or the Parliament is the national legislative body (CIA, 
2012). It consists out of 290 publicly elected members. It has a weak role compared with 
the presidency, as well as with the non-elected institutions such as the Guardian Council 
(United States Institute of Peace, NDb). The candidates must be vetted by the Guardian 
Council. This rule has brought many problems in the last two elections where many 
reformist candidates were not allowed to run, since the Guardian Council favors the 
right coalition (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 13). 
 
The presence of formal political parties in Iran is still very new. The conservative part 
usually works through political pressure groups and not in parties. Political parties are 
normally formed in the time of elections however they break up soon after the election 
finish (CIA, 2012).   
 
1.7. The Supreme Court and the Council of the Judiciary 
 
They represent the judicial branch and together they supervise the enforcement of all 
laws and establish judicial and legal policies (CIA, 2012). However judiciary decisions 
are never final in Iran, because influential clerics can justify the ruling as un-Islamic and 
may demand a different ruling (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 12). 
 
1.8. The Revolutionary Guard Corps 
 
Armed forces are an important factor in Iran. The Revolutionary Guard Corps were first 
established in 1979, after the revolution, to protect and defend the regime against threats. 
However today they still represent an important part in Iran`s politics. The 
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Revolutionary Guard Corps veterans have a 16% share of seats in the parliament (Bruno 
& Bajoria, 2011). Half of the President Ahmadinejad`s cabinet consists of former 
Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and he also appointed several officers to provincial 
governorship (Alfoneh, 2008). 
 
2. Political and economic development in Iran 
 
In this subchapter, the political and economic development of Iran will be researched in 
detail. I will emphasize the main political coalitions and their rivalry for the leading 
position in Iran. It is important to know more about the political development and 
political coalitions in Iran in order to better understand the behavior of Iran in 
international community. The historical background will be limited, it will not include 
the whole history, because it`s too broad and not relevant for this work. I will focus on 
recent historical developments such as presidency of Rafsanjani, Khatami and most 
importantly the Ahmadinejad presidency. They are relevant for the understanding of the 
conflict with EU, the establishment of the nuclear program and the assessment of 
economic sanctions imposed.  
 
— Political coalitions 
 
In Iranian politics there are three main poles; the left coalition, the right coalition and the 
center. Each side is represented by influential politicians that strive to conquer the 
leading position in the country. Ideological criterion such as left and right in Iran differs 
from the one we know in the European tradition. The left is understood by the Iranian 
political scientists as the clergy group that advocates for reform of the Iranian political 
system, the so called reformists. The opposing side, the right, is against reforms (Filin, 
2011). The left advocates the respect of people`s rights and political freedom. They 
believe that the guarantee of legal and political freedoms is most important for social 
and political growth. The main leader of the left is the former Iranian president 
Mohammad Khatami (Asayesh et al., 2011, p. 222).  
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The right splits into two groups, the conservative and the radical group (Filin, 2011). Its 
origin comes from the Shiite tradition and its main thinking is based on the idea that a 
country should be governed by a religious ruler (Asayesh et al., 2011, p. 222). The 
right`s economic policy strives toward laissez-faire capitalism, which means they oppose 
land reform, state control over major industries, controls on foreign trade. They want to 
remove the secularized legal system and impose Islamic legal codes. The main 
representative of the right`s radical group is the current president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. The right also has the support of the Council of Guardians (Wells, 1999, 
p. 30).  
 
The center takes some orientations from the right and some from the left. On economic 
matters they tend to lean more toward the right, on legal and cultural issues they tend to 
side with the left and are only partly supporting the alteration of the legal and 
educational system in the country. They also oppose the rights idea of removing all 
secular legal codes. They are referred as Rafsanjanists, since their informal leader is 
former president Rafsanjani (Filin, 2011). The main characteristic of the center is 
pragmatic approach to many political issues, therefore they are known as pragmatists 
(Wells, 1999, pp. 30–31).  
 
The Supreme Leader also plays an important role in Iranian politics. His role is to work 
as an arbiter between various groups of power, however he especially supports the right 
coalition (Filin, 2011). Despite the right`s control dominance over most of the 
institutions of state power, there has been a development in Iranian politics toward a 
more pluralist politics. There are more than 200 political parties, associations and 
organizations registered in the country (Green, Wehrey & Wolf, 2009, p. 96). 
 
— Political and economic development in Iran 
 
In 1979 the Islamic revolution took its place. The revolution established the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and gave Ayatollah Khomeini the position of the Supreme Leader. The 
war with Iraq, that was started my Saddam Hussein in 1980, brought great human 
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sacrifice, physical destruction and financial losses and it affected Iran in a great matter 
(Katouzian & Shahidi, 2008, pp. 3–4). The war was finished in 1989 and Iran had to find 
solutions to the main problems such as revival of exchange relations, rejection of the 
dictates of the state and giving more freedom to private entrepreneurs (Filin, 2011). The 
same year was marked also by the death of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and 
the beginning of the post–Khomeini period. His successor, the new supreme leader, 
became Ayatollah Khamenei (Katouzian & Shahidi, 2008, p. 4). 
 
The president of the post–Khomeini period was Hashemi Rafsanjani. The period of his 
ruling was known as the era of reconstruction. The main focus in this period was the 
reconstruction of the country after the war however little effort was put into democratic 
and political development (Asayesh et al., 2011, p. 221). The Pragmatists tried to pursue 
an economic reform and make the situation in the new country more normal. However 
the problem was that an economic reform was not possible without a political reform 
(Iran Politik, 2012).  
 
Reformism emerged in 1990, mostly because of dissatisfaction with the Rafsanjani 
regime and their incapability of dealing with economic and political problems that the 
country was facing. Reformists saw the solution to economic difficulties in the 
beginning of the process of democratization in earnest, with the focus on the civil 
society development and reconstruction of economy (Ansari, 2007, pp. 17–18). 
However Rafsanjani was re-elected in 1993 and remained president until 1997 elections. 
He began to cooperate with the left, soon after the re-election, to work together against 
the right and their aggressive tactics. In the parliamentary elections in 1996, the Council 
of Guardians, that was ruled by the right coalition, banned nearly all of the left coalition 
members and excluded the left from participating in the parliamentary elections. When 
the presidential elections came in 1997, the right did not have a strong candidate and the 
left`s main candidate Muhamad Khatami, gained the support of a number of left and 
centre professional organizations. He was known as the freedom candidate and he won 
the elections with 69% of votes (Wells, 1999, pp. 34–37). His victory was a 
consequence of voters wish for more-democratic and socially liberal views (Crane, Lal 
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& Martini, 2008, p. 29). This was the beginning of the third period, the reform era 
(Asayesh et al. 2011, p. 221).  
 
In 1999, Khatami introduced to the country the concept of nationwide municipal 
elections as a start of the development of civil society and electoral culture (Ansari, 
2007, p. 27). He wanted to put in practice all of the goals he set up during his campaign 
such as; implementation of constitutional civil rights, free dissidents and institute a level 
of equality for men and women in the framework of the existing order (Wilfried, 2000, 
p. 123).  
 
However, there have been several problems in the time of Khatami presidency that made 
the ruling more difficult. Most of these problems relate to ongoing reconstruction 
efforts, poor state of the economy, inflation, unemployment, and unrest in countryside 
(Wells, 1999, p. 38). The most significant economic improvement in the Khatami 
presidency was the unification of the exchange rate, which enabled that all international 
transactions have been conducted at one, unified rate (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 
87). An Economic Rehabilitation Plan has been formed in order to reform the country’s 
economy, however it has failed to provide a clear and consistent strategy to save the 
problems that the country was facing. By the early 2000, the economic situation of Iran 
further deteriorated. The main problem of Iran`s economy was the big dependency on 
oil. Approximately 80 percent of Iran`s foreign income has come from oil. The prices of 
oil have drastically dropped in the time period of Khatami presidency and Iran`s income 
has fallen extensively. The president has unsuccessfully tried to diversify and stop the 
countries extreme oil dependence. The economic challenges that Khatami was facing 
were enormous and they affected his popularity in a negative way (Wilfried, 2000, pp. 
171–172). 
 
3. The presidency of Ahmadinejad  
 
The last years before the new elections Khatami remained focused on finishing his 
presidential term in peace and quiet (Haghighi & Tahmasebi, 2006, p. 964). Since he 
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was already president for two terms he could not run for this position anymore. The right 
took this opportunity and put much effort in finding the right candidate that would help 
them come to the leading position of Iran. The strictly religious forces in Iranian society 
were of opinion that Khatami caused, with his political and social reforms, the 
disappearance of religious beliefs, especially among the youth. The working class was 
also unsatisfied with the situation in the country, and the new elections called for a 
candidate that was not so publicly known and was outside the sphere of power. 
Ahmadinejad was a candidate that campaigned as an outsider and who claimed not to 
have any ties with the ruling clique (Haghighi & Tahmasebi, 2006, p. 966). He came to 
the political sphere as a very unknown and unestablished candidate in the political arena. 
In 2003, he became the mayor of Teheran and this was the start of his public career. As a 
mayor he already showed his ultraconservative ideas of ruling, such as building parks 
only for women, reconstructing cultural halls into religious facilities and passing new 
policies to eliminate the financial separation of church and state (Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 
21-23).  
 
When election period in 2005 began, the Guardian Council prohibited all the women to 
run for president because it was not in accordance with the constitution (Jafarzadeh, 
2007, p. 26). Ahmadinejad registered as a candidate only on the last day. He presented 
himself as a humble man, coming from the poor, who served his country in the war and 
who wanted to listen and help the people of Iran (Ansari, 2007, p. 38). Ahmadinejad was 
a representative of a modest lifestyle as a contrast to the wealth and corruption of his 
main opponent Rafsanjani (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 30). He had the support of the 
Supreme Leader as well as the Guardian Council which both wanted someone from the 
ultraconservative side to rule the government. His main opponent in the elections, the 
former president Rafsanjani, was expected to win according to the first count of votes. 
The Interior Ministry, which was in charge of counting the votes, announced that 
Ahmadinejad was only on third place after the first round of elections. However the 
Guardian Council announced its own turn out that stated that Ahmadinejad and 
Rafsanjani come to the second round of elections because they had almost the same 
number of votes, the total vote tally was nearly 3 million votes higher than the Interior 
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Ministry`s count. This all lead to suspicions and accusations of fraud. In the second 
round of elections the victory of Rafsanjani was almost certain, however the turnout 
showed that Ahmadinejad received most votes and that voter turnout was an incredible 
60 percent (Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 28–29). This again caused an outrage over the results 
and accusations that some voters have been pressured or bribed to vote in favor of 
Ahmandinejad. The accusations also implied that he could not reach the results that he 
has without illegal assistance by the Supreme Leader`s son, the Guardian Council and 
the Revolutionary Guard Corps and paramilitary organization Basij (Crane, Lal & 
Martini, 2008, p. 30). 
 
The victory gave the right control of Iran`s two highest election offices – the presidency 
and the parliament – as well as a freer hand to the non–elected theocracy, which is 
responsible for approving all the important policies (Gannon, 2005). The government 
soon started to introduce its repressive measures. First one was the repression and arrests 
of intellectuals. The arrests have served to warn the academic community to avoid 
contact with foreign and diaspora colleagues, but it soon lead to government`s loss of 
support in the population at large. Another one of Ahmadinejad`s measures affected the 
Universities, as he decided to give the Universities a cultural revolution. With this he 
wanted to stop the secular education and also to close down the intellectual debates 
within universities as well as reducing the linkages that the universities had abroad. The 
repression of intellectual activity was presented as an act of national purification, since 
Ahmadinejad had the opinion that intellectuals polluted the purity of the Islamic 
revolution (Ansari, 2007, pp. 76–77). His hardliner conservative views were seen also 
on his pressure on the authorities to demand stricter Islamic dress code and the further 
repression of women rights. His rule was focused on establishing an ideal Islamic 
society and the external goal of founding global Islamic rule (Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 34–
35).  
 
The economic situation in Iran was still critical when Ahmadinejad began his 
presidency. At the beginning of his mandate it was expected that he would use the oil 
windfall to initiate an extensive program of infrastructural projects, putting people to 
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work, increasing salaries and rejuvenating the industrial base of the country. Most of all 
he was expected to overcome the main problem of Iranian economy that was and still is 
the dependence on oil revenues alone, and achieve a diversified economy based on tax 
and manufacture (Ansari, 2007, pp. 79–80). His goal was also to continue with the 
reforms that Khatami started, such as additional reductions in tariffs, and the 
privatization of state–owned enterprises (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 94). 
 
However, Ahmadinejad`s actions and policies soon showed that this will not be 
achieved. As the president decided to use Iran`s oil wealth on domestic investments and 
block foreign investments together with isolationist measures it became clear that the 
idea of establishing economic transparency in Iran, that is the main precondition of 
foreign investments, was very fast abandoned. It also became clear that Ahmadinejad`s 
plans of expenditure did not result in investments of any kind and no one knew where 
exactly the money was going (Ansari, 2007, p. 81). Ahmadinejad has made a lot of 
damage to the state economy also by imposing different economic policies such as 
targeting loans to favored firms, resorting to fuel rations rather than reducing the fuel 
price subsidy and his new privatization program seemed to be a way of rewarding 
regime supporters and preserving state control (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 94). 
Despite the promotion of privatization, the government continued with preferential 
treatment of state owned entities and the companies owned by the Revolutionary Guard 
Corps also enjoyed an increase of their role in economy (Green, Wehrey & Wolf, 2009, 
p. 23).  
 
The troubles enhanced since Iran was already unable to purchase goods from US, as the 
consequence of US sanctions, and the rising costs in Europe and the Far East were 
making the situation even worse. By the end of 2006 it became clear that the countries 
uncontrolled spending brought consequences in the form of inflation. The dramatic 
increase in liquidity and the reckless government spending had not been matched by any 
increase in available goods of domestic production, and consequently the prices went up. 
Iran has a trade based economy and this type cannot function in an isolated environment 
(Ansari, 2007, pp. 82–84). The economic policies for protection of domestic industries 
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by import reductions have made domestic producers even more inefficient for competing 
on international markets. Such economic policies have made the country even more 
dependent on oil and tax revenues (Crane, Lal & Martini, 2008, p. 95). And the fact that 
tax revenue makes up only about a fifth of the Iranian government`s budget again 
showed the main weaknes of Iran, that is a strict dependence on income from oil (Ramin 
& Daragahi 2008). Ahmadinejad`s method of reducing the inflation was drawing down 
bank interest, which significantly jeopardized the independence and function of the 
Central Bank of Iran (Green, Wehrey & Wolf, 2009, p. 24).  
 
As the business in Iran in 2006 was coming to a standstill also Ahmadinejad`s support 
went down, from the side of the mercantile elite as well as from the poor. He was also 
getting critics from the Parliament, whose constitutional duty was to scrutinize the 
government`s budgets and economic policy, however Ahmadinejad showed few concern 
about this and frequently refused to turn up for question time in the Parliament (Ansari, 
2007, p. 84).  The main element spoiling the economy was the excessive political control 
and interference in both decision-making and implementation. The elite remained in 
charge of economy and used it as a tool for gaining greater power (Green, Wehrey & 
Wolf, 2009, p. 24).  
 
In 2009, the presidential elections took place and everyone was expecting a change. 
However, the results of the elections once again showed the corrupt nature of Iranian 
politics. The main opposing candidate Moussavi had a strong lead in the final days of 
the campaign. But the Interior Ministry once again declared that Ahmadinejad has won 
with 62, 6 % of the vote and that his challenger received only 34%. Similar as the first 
time the turnout on the elections was extreme and reached 85%. Surprisingly the results 
of the elections were known already 2 hours after the elections, which provoked further 
suspicions (Worth, 2009). The results of elections were followed by street protests. The 
Revolutionary Guards tried to suppress the protests, which resulted in several deaths and 
many prosecutions of protesters (Bednarz & Follath, 2009). 
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4. The development of the nuclear program activities 
 
— Beginning and early developments of the nuclear program in Iran 
 
Iran`s nuclear program has been launched in the 1950s, and the first small 5 megawatt 
(MW) research reactor was built in Teheran with the technical assistance of the US 
(Lotfian, 2008, p. 159). The assistance by US was a part of program “Atoms for Peace”, in 
which nuclear energy technology was given to nations throughout the world in exchange 
for commitments of those countries that they would not develop nuclear weapons 
(Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 129). The US found it crucial to promote Iranian power in order to 
help them police the Persian Gulf region in times when the US were committed in Vietnam 
(Cronin, 2008, pp. 13–14). In 1968, Iran signed a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and ratified it in 1970. In 1974 an agreement with IAEA was signed, 
called the Safeguards Agreement, to allow full inspections of all Iran`s nuclear material. 
The same year also the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was established, and a 
20-year nuclear energy plan that included building 22 power reactors throughout the 
country was formed. The US and Iran also signed an agreement to exchange nuclear 
technology and cooperate in nuclear safety (Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 129–30). There were two 
main reasons why Iran was interested in the nuclear program at that time. The first was its 
energy plan based on optimum utilization of energy resources: oil, gas, hydro and nuclear. 
They wanted to achieve a large diversification of sources of energy in order to reach an 
optimal energy mix and to have a more flexible system of energy supply. The second 
reason was the rapid industrialization that was happening in the country at the time. Iran 
wanted the access to nuclear technology in order to take advantage of various applications 
of this technology in its scientific and industrial activities (Askarieh, 2008, p. 189).  
 
Iran signed a contract with West Germany`s Kraftwerk Union for the construction of the 
first nuclear power plant in the Persian Gulf city Bushehr (Lotfian 2008, p. 159), in 1974 
they also signed an agreement with France for five reactors, with a further two to be built 
under license from the US firm Westinghouse (Patrikarakos, 2009, p. 28). After the 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1979, the nuclear program development was stopped for the 
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next five years. The revolutionaries that replaced the Shah were against the nuclear 
program and were of opinion that it is a concept imposed from the West that they don`t 
want to support (Lotfian 2008, p. 160). The nuclear program was too expensive and 
according to the authorities ideologically unclean, therefore the government, in 1979, 
announced the unilateral abrogation of all the contacts made with Germany and France 
(Patrikarakos, 2009, p. 30). 
 
Despite that nuclear developments continued through the 1980s. In 1984 Iran built a new 
nuclear research laboratory at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which was the 
center that was originally intended for training the personnel that would work in the 
Bushehr reactor. The crucial partner that helped Iran at this point was China. China was 
involved in the expansion of the centre, which has grown more than necessary for peaceful 
research (Jafarzadeh 2007, p. 131). In 1985, China and Iran concluded a protocol of 
cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The agreement was not officially 
acknowledged at the time, but under the agreement China helped Iran develop the Esfahan 
Nuclear Technology Center. The work in the center included the research of reactor 
technology, the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment, and the chemical 
reprocessing of depleted uranium to extract plutonium (Garver, 2006, p. 143). China 
assisted Iran on the field of uranium enrichment with providing equipment related to laser 
enrichment experimentation, and China also represents an important source of raw supplies, 
providing Iran with natural uranium (Zarif, 2009). 
 
The centre was kept secret and was not declared to the IAEA as a nuclear facility until 1992 
(Garver, 2006, p. 143). There are records which show that Iran already in this time, hidden 
from the IAEA, executed experiments in uranium conversion and fuel production in this 
center, which was also a strict violation of the Non-Proliferation treaty that Iran signed and 
ratified. Iran also secretly imported uranium in 1982 for the use of these activities 
(Jafarzadeh 2007, p. 131). IAEA has only in 2003 after a closer inspection discovered a 
number of massively built secret rooms used for covered nuclear activities not previously 
declared to the IAEA (Garver, 2006, p. 143).  
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Several other agreements followed: a cooperative agreement with North Korea which 
anticipated Iran`s financing of North Korea`s modified ballistic missile program in 
exchange for completed missiles and assistance in developing the Iranian capacity to 
assemble and produce missile components (Zarif, 2009);  a cooperation agreement with 
Argentina, which anticipated that Argentina would sell Iran 20 percent enriched uranium 
for use in the small reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center; nuclear cooperation 
agreement with the Soviet Union. The defeat of Iran in the Iran–Iraq war, was explained by 
the lack of nuclear weapons on Iran`s side. The outcome of war even increased the 
motivation for developing a nuclear arsenal in the 1980s (Jafarzadeh, 2007, p. 131–132). 
After the war Iran strived toward a rebuild of the Bushehr reactor that was badly damaged 
during the Iraq bomb attacks. They asked Germany to resume the work on the facility. 
However Germany refused, mostly because of diplomatic pressure applied by the US. This 
has led to a legal dispute between Iran and German company Siemens and Iran claimed 
damages based on the fact that Iran paid for a nuclear plant that was never finished 
(Askarieh, 2008, p. 190). In 1995, after long negotiation, an agreement was set between 
Russia and Iran for the rebuild of the Bushehr reactor. The reactor would have been under 
the supervision of IAEA and it would be able to produce only maximum 180 kg plutonium 
per year (Ozcan & Ozdamar, 2009, p. 123). 
 
An important partner for Iran was also Pakistan, which has a nuclear bomb and is 
developing nuclear technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan, is a Pakistani scientist, that has helped 
Iran with its nuclear program in the 1980s. In 1987, the Atomic energy commissions from 
both countries concluded agreements on nuclear cooperation that was followed by a visit of 
Iran by Abdul Qadeer Khan, than the head of Pakistan`s uranium enrichment program 
(Spector & Smith, 1990, p. 212). According to the agreements between the two countries, 
Pakistan provided Iran a centrifuge design in order to help them resolve previous 
unsuccessful attempts to master uranium enrichment technology (Zarif, 2009). The deal 
between Khan and Iran, that was also made in 1987, included the training of at least six 
Iranian scientists in two Pakistani facilities, the Institute for Nuclear Science and 
Technology in Islamabad and The Nuclear Studies Institute in Nowlore. Khan has illegally 
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sold the overflow of nuclear equipment on the black market, and Iran was one of its first 
buyers (Jafarzadeh, 2007, pp. 133–134). 
 
— Revelations of covert nuclear weapons program 
 
The Non–Proliferation Treaty, in article IV, declares “(...) the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination (...)”. Iran, as a contacting state, has used this provision to 
justify its illegal actions concerning its nuclear program. First revelations of such actions 
have become known to the international community in 2002, which marks the beginning of 
the nuclear crises. The Iranian exile opposition group has, in 2002, announced that Teheran 
hides uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak. The existence 
of the sites was also confirmed by satellite photographs. Iran has declared that their 
program has peaceful aims and that it would allow IAEA inspections (Ozcan & Ozdamar, 
2009, p. 123).   
 
IAEA has made a visit to Iran in February 2003. During the visit the AEOI confirmed 
that a heavy-water production plant, which is not subject to comprehensive safeguards, 
was under construction near Arak together with a planned heavy-water research reactor. 
It also declared that a pilot- and commercial-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment 
plants were under construction in Natanz, which was also not reported previously (Kile, 
2006, p. 4). After the inspection in 2003, IAEA concluded that Iran violated the IAEA 
Safeguards agreement by not reporting the nuclear material, as well as the subsequent 
processing and use of that material, and by not declaring where the material was stored 
and processed. The whole international community was suspicious that Teheran was 
working toward a development of nuclear weapon. The fact that AEOI had secret 
budgets, independent bureaucratic operations and front companies in order to mislead 
IAEA supervision, made the suspicions even bigger (Jafarzadeh, 2007, p. 142). 
 
In August 2003, IAEA Board of Governors reported that Iran hasn`t provided a full 
access to certain key facilities and at times had provided them with incomplete or 
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contradictory information. Therefore IAEA adopted, in September 2003, a resolution in 
which it called on Iran to sign and implement the Additional Protocol of its Safeguards 
Agreement. The Resolution also stated that it will contact the UN Security Council if 
Iran fails to resolve all existing issues (Kile, 2006, p 7). The E3 (UK, France and 
Germany) started a series of negotiations and tried to use diplomacy to communicate 
with Iran. In October 2003, Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment in exchange 
for not having its violations reported to the UN Security Council, which could have 
imposed sanctions upon Iran. However serious disagreements about what the suspension 
will cover have soon emerged (Taylor, 2010, pp. 61–62). Iran signed the Protocol, but it 
did not ratify it which has severely restricted the IAEA`s inspections to known and 
declared facilities or inspection only by prior agreement on limited terms. In early 2004, 
it has become clear that Iran was not prepared to fully cooperate, that there were several 
new issues that need to be resolved and that Iran`s actions did not show any 
transparency. Furthermore, Iran also declared it would continue to manufacture 
centrifuges and experiment with Uranium Hexafluoride, two of the activities that most 
concerned the IAEA (Cordesman & Chair, 2004, p. 53). New information about Iran`s 
connection with Pakistan also became publicly known in 2004. A. Q. Khan, the 
Pakistani nuclear scientist, has declared that they have provided atomic secrets to Iran, 
Libya and North Korea since the late 1980. IAEA inspectors have after inspections 
confirmed similarities in design and components for the P-2 centrifuges, adding 
suspicions that Khan supplied both North Korea and Iran with the same know-how 
(Berman et al., 2009, 14). 
 
In fall 2004, E3 were leading negotiation with Iran in order to convince them to suspend 
the uranium enrichment program. The High Representative for the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana met with foreign ministers of France, Germany, UK 
and Iran in Paris where they signed the Suspension agreement (Kile, 2005, p. 15). They 
have agreed that: 
 
Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all 
enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of 
gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas 
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centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any 
plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion 
installation (IAEA, 2004). 
 
IAEA will be notified about the suspension and will monitor the whole process. The 
negotiations will continue in order to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement on long-
term arrangements. However, the EU efforts showed that the negotiations with Iran are 
not progressing fast enough. The E3 insisted that Iran has to accept the complete and 
permanent cessation of the enrichment program, since this was the only guarantee that 
the program has only peaceful purposes. Iran rejected the demand and claimed that the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the development uranium enrichment as a part of a 
peaceful nuclear program. The negotiations started to face serious difficulties (Kile, 
2005, pp. 17–18).  
 
In 2005, the radical candidate Mahmmud Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections, and 
together with countries Supreme Leader they announced that Iran will resume the uranium 
enrichment, regardless of the agreements with EU and international community (Taylor, 
2010, pp. 62–63). In fall 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant (Ozcan 
& Ozdamar, 2009, p. 124). The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a Resolution that for the 
first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. 
However, IAEA did not report Iran to the Security Council, but they gave him additional 
time to comply with the obligations. In January 2006, Iran announced it would resume 
uranium enrichment and research in Natanz. For this reason IAEA finally decided to report 
Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran also declared it would not implement the Additional 
Protocol to the Safeguard Agreement (Kerr, 2012b).  
 
— Measures taken by the international community 
 
UN Security Council has as a response to Iran`s violations, in July 2006, passed the 
Resolution 1696 (UN Security Council, 2006a), which called for Iran to suspend its 
uranium enrichment activities within a month and fully cooperate with the IAEA or face the 
possibility of diplomatic and economic sanctions (Taylor, 2010, p. 63). The E3 has tried to 
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go further with the negotiations however in fall 2006, EU foreign policy chief Solana 
declared that five months of intensive talks have brought no agreement on suspension of 
Iran`s nuclear activities (Berman et al., 2009, p. 14). Since there was no compliance with 
the Resolution 1696, UN Security Council responded on 23 December 2006 with 
Resolution 1737.  
 
The Resolution 1737 in its Preamble states the following: “(...) Security Council today 
imposed sanctions, (...) blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear material and 
equipment and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation 
sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems”. 
 
The Resolution further declared, in paragraph 2, the requirements that Iran has to fulfill: “ 
(...) Iran should, without further delay, suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities:  all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and 
development; and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a 
research reactor moderated by heavy water”. 
 
The Resolution has, in paragraph 17, also required member states to exercise vigilance and 
to let Security Council know if any individuals or entities connected to Iran`s nuclear 
activities was found on their territories (UN Security Council, 2006b). A Security Council 
Committee was also established with this resolution in order to undertake the tasks set out 
in paragraph 18 of this resolution. In 2010, the Council has, in the Resolution 1929, further 
established a Panel of Experts to assist the Committee (United Nations, ND). 
 
In order to continue the negotiations with Iran, China, Russia and US joined the E3 in 2006 
and tried to form another proposal for negotiations with Iran (Davenport, 2012a). The new 
called P5+1 group (five permanent members of Security Council and Germany) presented a 
proposal (Kerr, 2012a), which included several steps that Iran has to take, such as improve 
the cooperation with IAEA, suspend all enrichment-related activities and resume the 
implementation of the Additional protocol. In return there would be a suspension of the 
discussion of Iran`s nuclear program in the Security Council and an establishment of 
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several areas of cooperation between EU, US and Iran (Council of the European Union, 
2006). 
 
Iran has rejected the proposal of 2006 because of its requirement that Iran suspends its 
enrichment-related activities (Davenport, 2012a). The P5+1 group proposed a revised 
version of the proposal in 2008. Iran has presented its own proposal as a response to the 
P5+1 proposal. They have organized a meeting in Geneva, in order to come to some 
conclusions on a common proposal however the discussions were inconclusive because 
Iran refused to make any commitments regarding its nuclear program (Crail, 2008). 
 
During this time the UN Security Council has on 24 March 2007, as a response to Iran`s 
behavior, adopted the Resolution 1747. This resolution doesn`t have any additional 
requirements for Iran to fulfill, however it does impose new restrictions and expands the 
scope of the sanctions described in the previous resolution (Kerr, 2007). The new resolution 
does strengthen, in paragraph 2, provisions regarding the “exercise of vigilance which 
refers to the entry into or transit through their territories” of certain individuals, by adding 
additional persons being engaged in Iran`s proliferation activities (UN Security Council, 
2007). It further imposes new restrictions on the area of weapons transfer in paragraph 5, 
stating that: “(...) Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer (...) any arms or related material (...)” 
(UN Security Council, 2007). In paragraph 6, it also calls on all the states to exercise 
vigilance and restraint on the sale of certain weapons to Iran, “(...) in order to prevent a 
destabilizing accumulation of arms” (UN Security Council, 2007). The provisions further, 
in paragraph 7, call upon states and financial institutions not to give Iran any grants, 
financial assistance or concessional loans. 
 
IAEA has in its Report by the Director General of November 2007, where they revised the 
compliance of Iran with the Resolution 1737 and 1747, stated its concern about Iran`s non-
suspension of the enrichment related activities. IAEA also warned in paragraph 41 of 
Report by Director General about two major concerns relating to Iran`s nuclear program, 
which are: “(...) Iran`s current and past centrifuge enrichment program and the alleged 
studies (...)”, that could have military applications (IAEA Director General, 2007). 
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In the end of 2007, new secret information about Iranian enrichment activities became 
public. The National Council of Resistance of Iran, stated that Iran has stopped the nuclear 
weapons program in 2003, as the US National Intelligence Estimate was informed, however 
Iran secretly restarted the program a year later, in 2004 (Berman et. al., 2009, p. 13).  
 
This information and also the new announcement of Iran about its testing and advanced 
nuclear centrifuge, led to another resolution by the Security Council (Security Council 
Report, 2012). In March 2008, UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1803, which 
reaffirms all the calls from previous resolutions and brings additional sanctions. It adds new 
people to the list of individuals that cannot enter or transit through territories of States 
because of their involvement in Iran`s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities as well as to 
the list of the individuals whose funds, financial assets and economic resources need to be 
frozen (Davenport, 2012b). Further the sanctions include new provisions, defined in 
paragraph 10, that affect directly the Iranian state: “Calls upon all States to exercise 
vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks 
domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat (...)” (UN Security 
Council, 2008a). The Resolution also broadens the scope of sanctions on supply, sale and 
transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile-related items to Iran, in order to stop the 
development of the nuclear program (Davenport, 2012b). This Resolution, in its paragraph 
11, as well calls upon all States also to: (...) inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of 
aircrafts and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo 
and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (...), for prohibited goods (...)” (UN Security 
Council, 2008a). 
 
The IAEA has in its report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 
provisions of UN Security Council resolutions, in September 2008, declared that: ” (...) Iran 
still has not suspended its enrichment related activities (...)” (IAEA Director General, 
2008). End of September 2008, UN Security Council issued another resolution, Resolution 
1835. This resolution did not bring any new obligations for Iran and did not impose any 
new sanctions. It has only reaffirmed the four previous resolutions (UN Security Council, 
2008b). 
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— New concerns about Iran`s nuclear program 
 
In 2009, the P5+1 continued diplomatic talk with Iran, for the first time US took part as a 
full participant, which was the initiative of the new president Obama. They insisted that 
Iran freezes its uranium enrichment however Iran once again refused the propositions 
(Reynolds, 2009). In September of the same year, disturbing information about Iranian 
nuclear program became known to the IAEA, Iran notified IAEA that it was constructing a 
uranium enrichment facility called the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, near the city of Qom 
since 2007. They failed to inform IAEA about this activity sooner. Iran`s decision to inform 
IAEA about the plant, after they have begun with the construction raised concerns that the 
country could have other hidden facilities (Kerr, 2012a). The IAEA states in the Resolution, 
adopted on November 2009, that:” (...) Iran's declaration of the new facility reduces the 
level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities and gives rise to questions 
about whether there are any other nuclear facilities under construction in Iran which have 
not been declared to the Agency”. The resolution also urged Iran to stop the construction, 
clarify the intention regarding the purpose of the enrichment plant in Qom and called on 
Iran to comply with its safeguards obligations and implement and ratify the additional 
protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (IAEA Board of Governors, 2009).  
 
 
In May 2010, Iran signed an agreement with Brazil and Turkey on fuel-swap. The deal 
determined that Iran ships 1, 200 kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for fuel 
for a research reactor. However, this agreement did not bring a solution for the main 
problem of Iran`s nuclear program, which is Iran`s refusal to halt its enrichment program 
and address questions about its past nuclear activities (BBC news 2010). Therefore the UN 
Security Council agreed and adopted a new round of sanctions. Brazil and Turkey voted 
against such measures, but despite that the Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9, 2010 
(Security Council Report, 2012).  
 
The resolution reaffirmed all the obligations from the previous resolutions and it “(...) 
expanded the arms embargo and tightened restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises 
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related to proliferation-sensitive activities.” It prohibited Iran from acquiring any interest in 
commercial activities with other states that involve uranium mining, production or use of 
nuclear material. Besides the arms embargo it also prohibits Iran from doing any activity 
connected to ballistic missiles (UN Security Council, 2010). The resolution also imposes 
new inspection regime designed to detect and stop Iranian smuggling, such as inspections 
of vessels on high seas. The resolution also demanded that states require from their citizens 
and corporations to exercise vigilance when doing business with Iranian entities that are 
connected or involved in proliferation efforts (Davenport, 2012b). 
 
— Further negotiations 
 
In January 2011, a meeting of P5+1 with Iran followed in Istanbul. They tried to discuss 
proposals about a fuel exchange for the Teheran Research Reactor and ways to improve 
transparency through IAEA monitoring measures. However Iran, once again, was not 
willing to agree with the proposals. The meeting ended with the call of P5+1 to Iran about 
the need for a demonstration that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes 
(Ashton, 2011). The IAEA report 2011 again stated that Iran has still not implemented a 
number of obligations and also that Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation with the 
IAEA, in order to be able to conclude that their nuclear material is for peaceful activities 
(IAEA Director General, 2011). In addition to Iran’s non-cooperation, the Iran Sanctions 
Committee was informed by different States several times about Iran`s sanctions violations 
(Security Council Report, 2012). 
 
In April 2012, diplomatic negotiations between Iran and P5+1 were renewed in Istanbul 
(Davenport, 2012a). Further round of talks followed in May 2012 in Baghdad where Iran 
showed that they are more willing to cooperate and also address the issue of the 20% 
enrichment, however no agreement has yet been made (Borger, 2012). The next meeting 
took place in Moscow in June 2012. Also this set of talks ended without a breakthrough 
(Security Council Report, 2012). A technical meeting followed in July 2012 in Istanbul. 
There are two proposals that were discussed, one proposed by the P5+1 and the other one 
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by Iran. In Istanbul, both sides came to agree to expert-level talks in order to discuss the 
technical aspects of both proposals (Davenport, 2012a).  
 
Iran also held talks with the IAEA in Vienna in August 2012. The main purpose was to 
discuss the access of IAEA to Parchin military site. The negotiations ended without an 
agreement (Security Council Report, 2012). Parchin is a military site in Iran and suspicions 
about nuclear activities date back to 2004, when the satellite images showed this might be a 
site for research and experiments connected with nuclear energy (Hafezi & Dahl, 2012).  
 
IAEA Board of Governors adopted in September 13, 2012 a resolution which once again 
expressed concern about the nature of Iran`s nuclear program as well as recalled all the past 
obligations that Iran failed to comply with. It also called for a peaceful resolution of the 
concerns through diplomatic process (IAEA Board of Governors, 2012). This resolution 
was supported by P5+1 and also UN Security Council, which shared the same concerns 
(GOV. UK, 2012).  
 
The P5+1 met in November 2012, and started the next steps of negotiations with Iran 
(Security Council Report, 2012). However, the IAEA report of November 2012, once again 
presented disturbing information. They found that Teheran continued to install more 
centrifuges in Fordow complex and that they continues to experiment with advanced and 
more efficient types of centrifuges, however they are not yet using them for production-sale 
operations (Arms Control Association, 2012). IAEA and Iran held talks in Teheran on 
December 13, to discuss a further path for a better cooperation and to talk about IAEA 
concerns on Iran`s nuclear activities. The talks were according to both sides constructive 
and positive, they also agreed on a date for the next round of talks, which is January 16, 
2013. The main issue of enriching uranium to 20%, which is the key concern of the 
international community, remains unresolved since Iran still claims it is their right to do so 
(Isayev & Jafarov, 2012). 
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CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS ON IRAN 
 
Iran and Europe have had contacts with each other for centuries (Tarock, 1999, p. 41). The 
EU as a whole is Iran`s biggest trading partner and Iran is the sixth largest supplier of 
energy to the EU, and 90 percent of EU imports from Iran are energy and energy related 
products (Farrar–Wellman, 2010). Iran has especially well developed trade with certain 
individual members in the EU, such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Belgium (Makanaka, 2012), as 
well as with Germany, UK and France (Eurostat in The British Iranian Chamber of 
Commerce, 2011). Iran and the West have argued about the nature of Iranian nuclear 
program for years. Their economic relations are despite their importance constantly 
influenced and affected by Iran`s illegal activities.  
 
US prohibited nearly all trade and investments with Iran, which is the consequence of 
Iran`s sponsorship of terrorism, refusal to comply with the international obligations on its 
nuclear program and, its human rights violations (US Department of State, 2012). US have 
with its hatred toward Iran also a big influence on the EU relations with this country. The 
fear of the whole international community about Iran`s possibility of developing a nuclear 
bomb has pushed EU into gradually taking further measures for stopping this activity (New 
York Times, 2012). When Iran failed to restore international confidence in the exclusively 
peaceful nature of its nuclear program, EU decided to take tougher measures (HM 
Government, 2012).  
 
This chapter contains a set of information ranging from the start of Iran–EU relations up to 
the beginning of conflicts and the imposition of economic sanctions. Attention will be 
given to sectors of trade between Iran and EU as well as trade between individual EU 
members and Iran. EU`s diplomatic measures to solve the issues with Iran and the 
imposition of economic sanctions will be presented in detail. 
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1. Relations between Iran and the EU 
 
1.1. History of Iran and EU economic cooperation 
 
EU and Iran have had an Agreement of cooperation in the time of Shah, but it lapsed in 
1977, before the Islamic Revolution. Dialogue on cooperation between EU and Iran was 
first initiated in 1995 and was further extended after the election of president Khatami in 
1997 that opened Iranian economy (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). In 
October 1998, EU General Affairs and External Relations Council asked the Commission 
to establish contact with Iran in order to see the possibilities for cooperation. A technical 
meeting was set up with the Iranian site, on which they agreed on two working groups, for 
Energy and for Trade and Investment (Reissner & Whitlock, 2004). After the meeting of 
the working group on Energy in 1999, Iran became an observer of the Inogate program, 
which is one of the EU`s regional energy cooperation programs. Iran also became an 
observer in the TRACECA-east-west land communication program (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001). Iran became a member of Traceca, however it is since 
2010, due to UN Security Council and EU sanctions, not provided with assistance from this 
program (Traceca, ND).  
 
The Council adopted a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive trade and cooperation 
agreement and a political dialogue agreement in 2001. The negotiations started in 2002 and 
lasted until 2005, when they were stopped due to revelations on Iran`s nuclear activities 
(Council of the European Union, 2012e). An agreement is a normal channel through which 
the EU develops relations with other countries and trading partners and it would bring a 
closer cooperation in several sectors such as, science and technology, energy, transport, 
environment, drugs control, asylum and migration, education and culture and any other area 
of shared interest. Such an agreement would bring new benefits for Iran not only in the 
form of a new trading partner but it would also help Iran in achieving its aim of becoming a 
member of WTO (World Trade Organization) (Council of the European Union, 2009). 
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Under the Rafsanjani regime, business environment in Iran became friendlier and European 
companies were ready to invest. However there were many practical obstacles that made 
business with Iran more difficult such as, overbearing bureaucracy, weak legal system and 
the absence of a Trade and cooperation agreement. Trade relations became even more 
difficult under the Ahmadinejad government (Posch, ND). The Commission observes in its 
first communication on Iran relations in 2001, that Iran`s economy is inefficient, 
unreformed and centralized. Also the administrative and legal environment for trade and 
investments was characterized as not transparent and arbitrary (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001). This communication was issued in the time of Khatami 
rule, when Iran`s economy was most open to world market, after Ahmadinejad became the 
president the situation became even worse. 
 
1.2. Sectors of EU-Iran cooperation in trade 
 
Trade with Iran is subject to the EU general import regime, since Iran in not a member of 
the WTO and there is also no existing bilateral agreement between the EU and Iran. Trade 
with Iran is currently also subject to sanctions imposed by UN Security Council and EU 
sanctions regime (Directorate-General for Trade, 2012). 
 
After United Arab Emirates, EU represented second place of Iran`s major import partners 
and first place of Iran`s major export partners in 2011. Iran`s other top five import partners 
are: China, Turkey, South Korea. And other among top five export partner are: China, 
Japan, India and Turkey (European Commission, 2012). 
 
For EU in 2011, Iran is on the 23 place of the major import partners and on the 30 place of 
the major export partners. Among top five import partners of EU are China, Russia, US, 
Norway and Switzerland. The main five export partners are: US, China, Switzerland, 
Russia and Turkey (European Commission, 2012).  
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One of the main SITC
1
 sections of EU`s imports from Iran are: Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials, Chemicals and related products, Food and live animals, 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
(European Commission, 2012). In 2011, 5, 98% of all crude oil imports came from Iran, 
which puts Iran on the sixth place of the EU`s main import partners for crude oil (European 
Commission, 2011). The first place is taken by Russia with 29, 63 % in 2011 (European 
Commission, 2011), however EU`s primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high 
proportion of imports are concentrated among only few partners. Therefore Iran can play an 
important role in diversifying the resources (Eurostat, 2012). For EU, the imports from Iran 
represented 0, 9% of the total share of imports in 2011 (European Commission, 2012). 
Almost 90% of all EU imports from Iran are oil and related products (Council of the 
European Union, 2012e). 
 
One of the main SITC sections of EU export to Iran are: Machinery and transport 
equipment, Chemicals and related products, Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material, Miscellaneous manufactured articles, Food and live animals, Crude materials, 
inedible except fuels. For EU the exports to Iran represented 0, 7% of the total share of 
exports in 2011 (European Commission, 2012). 
 
The EU trade balance
2
 with Iran was estimated on 5 399 million in 2011, which means that 
the EU exports to Iran were lower that the imports from Iran (European Commission, 
2012). By imposing sanctions on Iran, Iran will have problems with loosing EU as an 
important export partner, but also EU will have to search for new markets for import of 
goods in certain sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 SITC stands for Standard International Trade Classification and is a is a product classification of the United 
Nations used for external trade statistics.  
2
 Trade balance is the difference between a country`s imports and its exports. A country has a trade deficit if 
it imports more that it exports; the opposite scenario is a trade surplus (Investopedia, ND). 
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1.3. Bilateral trade cooperation between Iran and individual EU member states 
 
By country, Italy, Spain, Greece and Belgium are the countries that most rely on import of 
Iranian crude oil (the main sector of EU`s imports from Iran) and collectively account for 
almost 80% of EU`s crude oil imports from Iran. In 2010, Belgium accounted for 10%, 
Greece for 9%, Spain for 25%, Italy for 34%, and other countries for 16% (Institute of 
Energy Economics Japan, 2012). Before the economic sanctions were imposed, some 500, 
000 barrels arrived from Iran to Europe every day, with southern European countries 
consuming most of it. Greece is the most exposed, since it received a third of all its oil 
imports from Iran, as well Italy with 13 percent of its oil needs (Makanaka, 2012). 
 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and France are the top EU states trading partners of Iran. 
Germany`s exports to Iran are the highest among the top EU states in the time period 2005–
2011, and amounted in 2011 for 3, 089. 7 million euro (Eurostat in The British Iranian 
Chamber of Commerce, 2011) the percentage of German exports in 2010-11 was 7% of 
total goods imported to Iran (ECO Trade and Development Bank, 2012). As an importer 
from Iran, Germany stands on the third place throughout the period 2005–2011 (Eurostat in 
The British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 2011). Iranian market is very important for 
Germany, since they can offer its specialized machinery without competition from the US 
(Daragahi, 2010), because US prohibits nearly all trade and investments with Iran (US 
Department of State, 2012). Some of the biggest German companies, such as Siemens, 
Ferrostaal, BASF, Thyssen Krupp, are successfully doing business with Iran for several 
years (Dempsey, 2010). In 2011, German export to Iran dropped for 19% comparing with 
the previous year. The sharp decline in German exports to Iran is the result of the non-
conclusion of business contracts as a result of UN and EU economic sanctions (Federal 
Foreign Office, 2012a). 
 
Italy was the second biggest exporter to Iran and the first importer from Iran in the years 
2005–2011. In 2011, they imported for 5327 million from Iran, which is far more than the 
other three leading countries, on the second place is France with only 1747 million 
(Eurostat in The British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 2011). The trade between Iran and 
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Italy is based on materials used for infrastructure, industry and energy, but the largest part 
of Italian export to Iran is machinery (Fidler & Stevens, 2010). In 2010, Italian exports to 
Iran even increased, in the engineering economic sector the exports rose 50%. The 
Federation of Italian Association of Mechanical and Engineering Industries reported that 
robotics field increased its exports to Iran by 384%, the steam turbines export increased 
236% and thermic machines imports grew by 106% (Meotti & Wienthal, 2011). Major 
Italian companies, such as Eni, Edison International, have an established cooperation with 
Iran. Eni, a major Italian gas company, is operating in Iran since 1950s (Fidler & Stevens, 
2010). It has signed a 550 million deal with the National Iranian Oil Company in 2001, to 
develop in cooperation with them the Darkhovin oilfield (BBC Monitoring, 2009). Edison 
International, another big Italian company signed an Exploration and Development contract 
with National Iranian oil Company in 2008 for Dayyer oil field (Oilvoice, 2010). Over the 
decades, Iran has given Italian oil companies access to developing some of its largest oil 
fields (Fidler & Stevens, 2010).  
 
France was, in 2011, the third largest exporter to Iran and the second largest importer from 
Iran (Eurostat in The British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 2011). 55% of French exports 
to Iran are coming from the automotive sector and other sectors such as hydrocarbon sector, 
rail and shipping transport and the financial sector. French imports from Iran are mostly 
crude oil (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). A reciprocal agreement to encourage 
and protect investments was signed in May 2003, was aimed to establish a more favorable 
legal framework for companies (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Several major 
countries are present and doing business in Iran, such as: Total group, Renault, Alcatel, 
PSA Peugeot Citroën (Daragahi, 2004). Renault is the second most prolific foreign 
automaker in Iran, and is highly active in the Iranian auto industry as well as has 
established partnership with regime-controlled entities (Business Wire, 2012). PSA Peugeot 
Citroën has made a licensing agreement with an Iranian company Iran-Khodro, for the 
production of Peugeot 206 and 207 in Iran. 60% of the car parts should be manufactured 
locally (Iran Tracker, 2010). The Total group, one of the largest energy concerns, formed in 
2004 a $ 2 billion venture with the National Iranian Oil Corporation and Petronas of 
Malaysia, Pars LGN, which aims to produce 8 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas a 
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year, equal to about 15 percent of current world output (Daragahi, 2004). Involved on the 
South Pars project are also two other major European companies, Royal Dutch Shell and 
Repsol YPF, which have made a $ 10 billion deal to produce 16 million tones/year of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Watkins, 2007). 
 
United Kingdom was in 2011, the fourth largest importer and exporter among EU countries 
(Eurostat in The British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, 2011). There is an established 
British Iranian chamber of commerce, to promote trade among the two countries (The 
British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, ND). In 1994, the British-Iranian business 
association was established, to provide a forum for British-Iranian business (British Iranian 
Business Association, ND). One of the biggest oil companies, Sell was ranked as Iran`s 
biggest corporate client, along with French Total group. They have established a long-
lasting relationship with Iran through their work in Iran`s oilfield and years of crude oil 
purchases (Mably & Mackey, 2012).  
 
1.4. EU economic sanctions on Iran 
 
— Pressure from the US 
 
The use of sanctions against Iran has enjoyed much less support from the EU than it has 
from US. The use of sanctions against Iran was for the US somehow challenging, since 
there were already so many US restrictions in place against Iran. Therefore US imposed 
financial sanctions that sought to deny Iran`s access to international business sector, by 
exploring the advantage deriving from US being the world`s leading financial centre 
(Taylor 2010, p. 68). Iran Sanctions Act was imposed by US to try to deny Iran the 
resources for the further development of its nuclear program and deny the support to 
terrorist organizations. The act authorizes US penalties against foreign firms which do 
business with Iran (Katzman, 2011). The target of the US approach were, besides Iranian 
companies, those foreign companies, especially banks, who were supporting exports or 
processing dollar transactions for Iranian banks. The US was trying to convince companies 
and government officials to stop doing business with Iran. The greatest concern for the 
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companies doing business with Iran was losing the access to US market because of such 
activities. The German Siemens faced the threat of losing $300 million worth of contracts 
with the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority on the grounds that it sold 
equipment to the Iranian regime which was used to conduct surveillance on dissidents  
(Taylor, 2010, pp. 68–73). US unilateral sanctions against Iran, caused differences of 
opinion between the US and EU because they mandate US imposition of sanctions on 
foreign firms. EU has strictly opposed such unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial effects 
because they can threaten the open international trading system. EU has even adopted a 
Blocking Statute to prevent any EU company from complying with Iran sanctions act 
imposed by US (Patten, 2001). 
 
When adopting sanctions against Iran in 2012, EU was under constant pressure from US, 
who wanted the EU to adopt such sanctions even sooner. They were pressuring EU to move 
faster in isolating Iran`s financial sector (Norman, 2012).  
 
— EU diplomatic measures  
 
EU suspended formal talks on trade and cooperation with Iran in June 2003, because of 
high concern over the nature of Iran`s nuclear program. In order to negotiate with Iran the 
three EU states, France, UK and Germany formed together the E3 group (Kile, 2005, p. 
108). Russia, China and US joined in 2006 the three EU states and together they formed the 
P5+1 (Davenport, 2012a). The formation of E3 to negotiate the solution to the Iranian 
nuclear problem reflects the traditional EU preference for the use of incentives over 
sanctions (Taylor, 2010, 74).  
 
First the E3, and later P5+1 group offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear 
issue. Iran has made a suspension agreement with the E3 in 2004, and agreed to temporary 
stop the uranium enrichment process and signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement. This success by the E3 has ended in 2005, when Iran stopped the voluntary 
implementation of the Additional protocol and continued with uranium enrichment (Nikou, 
ND). P5+1 offered Iran in 2006 comprehensive negotiations and prepared several 
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proposals, which Iran once again refused. The comprehensive negotiations were again 
offered to Iran in 2008 and also this time there were no conclusions made (American 
Foreign Policy Project, 2009). The proposals were in a new form offered to Iran once again 
in 2008. A consensus was reached on a draft agreement, but Iran finally resigned due to 
domestic opposition in 2009 (Nikou, ND). New rounds of talks were organized in 2012 in 
Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow, however the only agreement that was reached was on 
expert-level talks (Davenport, 2012a). 
 
— EU economic sanctions 
 
The position of EU begun to change in 2005, when clear evidence regarding the 
existence of Iranian nuclear weapon program appeared (Taylor, 2010, pp. 74). EU has 
adopted, as a response to UN Resolutions, several Positions, Decisions and Regulations 
that impose sanctions determined by the Security Council and also added their own 
measures (Iran Watch, ND). 
 
There were some differences among the 27 members of EU when it came to sanctions 
against Iran. UK and France have favored the imposition of sanctions and Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, (Taylor, 2010, 78) Cyprus and Greece on the other side opposed the 
sanctions (Baker, 2009). France and UK both made proposals for additional sanctions 
against Iran and were supporting the US efforts to impose EU sanctions against both Bank 
Melli and Bank Saderat. Germany on the other side, was the main country opposing 
sanctions, since it is Iran`s leading European trading partner and Iran is a major market for 
German industrial and technological products (Taylor, 2010, 78–79).  
 
The Council adopted its first Common Position in February 2007 in order to implement the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1737, and they also added additional sanctions measures, 
such as additional persons and entities that would be subject to asset freeze (Council of the 
European Union, 2007a). In April 2007, Council issued the second Common Position in 
order to, besides the already implemented measures of Resolution 1737, implement the 
sanctions determined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1747. Again EU added its 
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own restrictions (Council of the European Union, 2007b), they imposed a more 
comprehensive arms embargo and again added additional persons and entities to travel 
restrictions (Taylor, 2010, p. 76). In August 2008, the Council adopted a Common Position 
as a response to UN Security Council Resolution 1803, again using stronger measures that 
the UN imposed by adding additional persons and entities to be covered by the restrictions 
on admission and the freezing of funds (Council of the European Union, 2008). On July 26, 
2010, the Council adopted a Decision which implemented the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1929, as well as all the previous Resolutions, and again added its own 
accompanying measures on the areas of trade, financial sector, transport sector and oil and 
gas industry (Council of the European Union, 2010). However this time the EU unilateral 
measures were much stricter and broader than in its previous Decisions. The Council has 
throughout 2011 in May, October and December, adopted three Decisions which have 
added additional persons and  entities included in the list of persons and entities subject to 
restrictive measures (Council of the European Union, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c).  
 
Further lack of engagement from the Iranian side made EU decide, at the end of 2011, to 
extend sanctions regime. Therefore in January 2012, the Council decided to broaden the 
existing sanctions adopted in the previous documents, and added in its new, unilateral 
Decision with measures that severely affected Iranian financial system, transport sector, 
energy sector, and measures against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Council of the 
European Union, 2012a). In March 2012, Council issued another Decision, further 
amended the sanctions by imposing targeted financial measures against the providers of 
specialized messaging services (Council of the European Union, 2012b). Further and more 
extended sanctions were imposed with the Council Decision in October 2012 on trade, 
financial sector, oil tankers construction, and they also included new persons and entities on 
the list of travel ban and assets freeze (Council of the European Union, 2012c). The last set 
of sanctions was imposed in December 2012 with the Council Decision, which once again 
amended the previous Decision with provisions on monitoring the activities between the 
EU and Iran financial institutions, as well as added additional persons and entities on the 
list of travel ban and asset freeze (Council of the European Union, 2012d). 
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— Implementation of EU restrictive measures on Iran 
 
The measures taken by the EU in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, and in all the 
following Decisions amending this Decision consist in: 
 
— Export and Import Restrictions 
 
Prohibition on trade of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime lists; arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, 
para-military equipment and spare parts for such arms and related materiel, as well as 
equipment which might be used for internal repression; other dual-use goods and 
technology (Article 1 (1)). 
 
It is also prohibited to provide technical assistance or training, investment, or brokering 
services related to items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as well as provide 
financing or financial assistance related to items and technologies that could contribute to 
Iran's nuclear enrichment and weapons development (Article 1 (3)). 
 
The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for use in, or the benefit of Iran, by 
nationals of Member States or through the territories of Member States of items, materials, 
equipment, goods and technology, including software that could contribute to nuclear 
enrichment and weapons development, shall be subject to authorization on a case-by-case 
basis by the competent authorities of the exporting Member State. (Article 2) 
 
The import, purchase or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products shall be 
prohibited (article 3a). The execution of contracts concluded before 23 January 2012 on 
Iranian crude oil and petroleum products can be done until 1 July 2012 (Article 3c). 
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The import, purchase or transport of Iranian petro-chemical products shall be prohibited 
(article 3b). The execution of contracts concluded before 23 January 2012 on the supply of 
petrochemical products, can be done until 1 July 2012 (Article 3d). 
 
The import, purchase or transport of Iranian natural gas shall be prohibited (article 3e). 
 
The Decision prohibits Member States to provide financing and financial assistance as well 
as insurance and reinsurance, related to crude oil, petro-chemical products and natural gas 
to Iran (Article 3e). 
 
The sale, supply or transfer of key equipment and technology for the petrochemical 
industry in Iran by nationals of Member States is prohibited (article 4a). Any obligation 
relating to the delivery of goods provided for in contracts concluded before 26 July 2010 or 
October 2012 must be executed until 15 April 2013 (Article 4b). 
 
The sale, supply or transfer to Iran of graphite, and raw or semi-finished metals, such as 
aluminum and steel, relevant to industries controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or which are relevant to Iran's nuclear, military and ballistic missile program, by  
Member States shall be prohibited (article 4e). Execution of contracts concluded before 16 
October 2012 can be executed until 15 April 2013 (Article 4f). 
 
The sale, supply or transfer of key naval equipment and technology for ship-building, 
maintenance or refit, to Iran or to Iranian or Iranian-owned enterprises engaged in this 
sector, by Member States, shall be prohibited. (Article 4g). Execution of contracts 
concluded before 16 October 2012 can be executed until 15 April 2013 (Article 4h). 
 
The sale, supply or transfer to Iran of software for integrating industrial processes, which is 
relevant to industries controlled directly or indirectly by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or which is relevant to Iran's nuclear, military and ballistic missile program, by 
Member States, shall be prohibited (Article 4i). Execution of contracts concluded before 16 
October 2012 can be executed until 15 April 2013 (Article 4j). 
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The Decision also prohibits Member States to provide Iran with technical assistance or 
training and other services or financing or financial assistance related to equipment and 
technology for the petrochemical industry, graphite, and raw or semi-finished metals, 
naval equipment, naval equipment, software for integrating industrial processes. 
 
The direct or indirect sale, purchase, transportation or brokering of gold and precious 
metals, as well as of diamonds, to, from or for Iran is prohibited (Article 4c). 
 
The delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and 
coinage to or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran shall be prohibited (Article 4d). 
 
— Restrictions on Financing of certain enterprises 
 
Investment in the territories under the jurisdiction of Member States by Iran in any 
commercial activity involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and 
technology, in particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water 
related activities or technologies related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons, shall be prohibited (Article 5). 
 
It is prohibited the granting of any financial loan or credit and the acquisition or extension 
of a participation in enterprises in Iran that are engaged in the Iranian petro-chemical 
industry, or to Iranian or Iranian-owned enterprises engaged in that industry outside Iran; 
the creation of any joint venture with enterprises in Iran that are engaged in the Iranian 
petrochemical industry (Article 6a). 
 
— Restrictions on financial support for Trade 
 
Member States shall exercise restraint in entering into new short term commitments for 
public and private provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of 
export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade; 
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Member States shall not enter into new medium and long-term commitments for public and 
private provided financial support for trade with Iran (Article 8). 
 
The construction or the participation in the construction of new oil tankers for Iran or for 
Iranian persons and entities shall be prohibited (Article 8a). 
 
It shall be prohibited to provide technical assistance or financing or financial assistance to 
the construction of new oil tankers for Iran or for Iranian persons and entities (Article 8a). 
 
— Financial Sector 
 
Member States shall not enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance and 
concessional loans to the Government of Iran (Article 9). 
 
Member States shall not enter into any transactions with: banks domiciled in Iran, in 
particular the Central Bank of Iran; branches and subsidiaries of banks domiciled in Iran 
weather within or outside the jurisdiction of the Member States; financial entities that are 
not domiciled in Iran, but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in Iran. Unless 
authorized by a Member State (Article 10(1)). 
 
Certain transactions are permitted, however they must be authorized in advance. Such 
transactions include: transactions regarding foodstuffs, healthcare, medical equipment, or 
for agricultural or humanitarian purposes; transactions regarding personal remittances; 
transactions regarding the execution of the exemptions provided for in this Decision; 
transactions for a specific trade contract; transactions regarding a diplomatic or consular 
mission or an international organization enjoying immunities; transactions regarding 
payment to satisfy claims against Iran (Article 10(2)). 
 
The transfers of funds in sectors that are permitted face certain limitations regarding the 
amount of the transfer; Authorization by a member state is needed when: transactions 
regarding foodstuffs, healthcare, medical equipment, or for agricultural or humanitarian 
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purposes are above 100 000 EUR; transactions regarding personal remittances are above 40 
000 EUR (Article 10 (3)). 
 
Financial institutions shall be required, in their activities with banks and financial 
institutions to: exercise continuous vigilance over account activity including through their 
programs on customer due diligence and under their obligations relating to money-
laundering and financing of terrorism; require that all information fields of payment 
instructions which relate to the originator and bene-ficiary of the transaction in question be 
completed; maintain all records of transactions for a period of five years (Article 10(3a)). 
 
The opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks in the 
territories of Member States, and the establishment of new joint ventures, or the taking of 
an ownership interest, or the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by 
Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, its branches and subsidiaries is 
prohibited (Article 11). 
 
Financial institutions within the territories of Member States or under their jurisdiction 
shall be prohibited from opening representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in 
Iran (Article 11). 
 
The provision of insurance and re-insurance to Iran shall be prohibited (Article 12). 
 
The direct or indirect sale or purchase of, or brokering or assistance in the issuance of 
public or public-guaranteed bonds issued after the entry into force of this Decision to and 
from Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or banks domiciled in Iran  shall be prohibited (Article 
13). 
 
Member States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms 
incorporated in their territories or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when 
doing business with entities incorporated in Iran including those of the Iranian 
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Revolutionary Guard Corps and of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (Article 
14). 
 
— Transport Sector 
 
Member States shall inspect all cargo to and from Iran in their territories, including seaports 
and airports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the 
cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited (Article 
15(1)). 
 
Member States may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the 
flag State, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the 
vessels carry items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited (Article 15 
(2)). 
 
Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from Iran shall be subject to the requirement 
of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a 
Member State (Article 15 (4)). 
 
Member States shall seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which 
is prohibited (Article 15(5)). 
 
Member States shall repost about any information available on transfers or activity by Iran's 
Air's cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the IRISL to other companies (Article 
16). 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent access to the airports under 
their jurisdiction of all cargo flights operated by Iranian carriers or originating from Iran 
with the exception of mixed passenger and cargo flights (Article 17). 
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The provision by nationals of Member States, of engineering and maintenance services to 
Iranian cargo aircraft shall be prohibited if there is information indicating that the cargo 
aircraft carry items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited (Article 18). 
 
— Restrictions on Admission 
 
Member States should prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of persons 
providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development 
of nuclear weapon delivery systems, for instance by acquiring prohibited goods and 
technology or by assisting listed persons or entities in violating UN and EU provisions; and 
other members of the IRGC (Article 19). 
 
Currently such restrictions apply to 105 persons, 43 of them have been designated by the 
UN, and the others are autonomous EU designations. Those individuals are also subject to 
an asset freeze (Council of the European Union, 2013). 
 
— Freezing of Funds and Economic Resources 
 
All funds and economic resources which belong to entities and persons associated with 
associated with Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of 
nuclear weapon delivery systems, for instance by acquiring prohibited goods and 
technology or by assisting listed persons or entities in violating UN and EU provisions; and 
senior members and entities of IRGC and the IRISL. This includes the Central Bank of Iran 
(Council of the European Union, 2013). 
 
Currently such freezing of funds and economic resources amounts to 490, including the 
Iranian central Bank. 76 of them were designated by UN and others are autonomous EU 
designations. They include companies the banking and insurance sectors, the nuclear 
technology industry and in the field of aviation, armament, electronics, shipping, chemical 
industry, metallurgy and the oil and gas industry as well as branches and subsidiaries of 
IRGC and IRISL (Council of the European Union, 2013). 
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2. Critical Analysis 
 
2.1. Assessment of efficiency of economic sanctions and its impact on Iran  
 
Assessment of efficiency will be made based on the political and economic variables 
determined in Chapter 1. 
 
2.1.1. Political variables 
 
— Companion Policy measures 
 
Measures used by the EU were first diplomatic, basing on the negotiations and propositions 
to the Iranian government. After there was no success the EU decided to take further 
measures which were economic sanctions and these are the last and the strictest form of 
sanctions imposed. Since the EU has a preference for soft measures, as it has already shown 
in the resistance to sanctions imposed by the US, there is little possibility that there will be 
a use of covert action, quasi-military action or regular military action. 
 
— International cooperation  
 
International cooperation with EU economic sanctions is most crucial from the countries 
that are big trade partners of Iran. Among the great trade partners of Iran that are supporting 
EU measures are: Japan, Turkey, UAE, South Korea and US. 
 
Japan was, in 2010, the third main exporting market for Iran (European Commission, 
2012). It has been slowly decreasing its imports of Iranian oil ever since the 2006 sanctions 
took effect, and has reduced it by roughly 40 percent. Over the last several years, Japan is 
one of the closest partners of EU and US in international cooperation for the sanctioning of 
Iran`s nuclear program (Smith, 2012). The main problem for Japan is the energy security 
situation and the longstanding dependence on Iranian oil, which can explain the reason why 
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the Japanese government has not played a leading role in the sanctions against Iran (Taylor, 
2010, 82). 
 
Turkey stands somewhere in the middle between the EU and Iran. Turkey is heavily 
dependent on Iranian crude oil and has therefore, in 2010, voted against sanctions on Iran in 
the UN Security Council (Taspinar, 2012). However it does in the recent years represent a 
key ally of EU in the region. Turkey has cooperated with the sanctions imposed by the EU 
and US to a certain degree, they have decided to cut oil imports from Iran for 20% in 2012 
(Dombey, 2012), which is an important step. On the other side Turkey represents the main 
channel for Iran`s trade with Europe. Since Turkey is a preferred trade partner of the EU 
and Iranians do not need a visa to enter this state, Iran can buy goods from Europe through 
Turkey (Lipshiz, 2012). 
 
The UAE have also been supportive to sanctions on Iran. They have implemented all the 
UN Security Council sanctions and shut down several companies in Iran (Shaheen, 2010). 
The biggest change in trade with Iran has occurred in Dubai, which is the leading trade 
center of UAE. Changes in this confederation are crucial since they represent Iran`s major 
import partner and an important connection with the rest of the world (Rosenberg, 2011). 
 
South Korea has also shown support for the EU sanction on Iran. It was the first one of the 
major importers (besides India, China and Japan) of crude oil from Iran to announce it will 
give up supplies (RT, 2012a). South Korea halted imports of Iranian crude oil in beginning 
of July 2012 as a response to EU sanctions. It has been able to do so by increasing import 
from other Middle East nations (Stangarone, 2012). 
 
The most crucial international support comes from the US. US has been the initiator of 
sanctions against Iran. Although US is not amongst the important trade partner of Iran, 
since it has limited its relations with Iran to almost none, it is an important superpower that 
has a lot of influence on the behavior of the whole international community. As already 
mentioned, US has imposed Iranian Sanctions Act, which has extraterritorial effects, 
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sanctioning all the companies that make business with Iran, therefore influencing the whole 
international community (Patten, 2001). 
 
— International Assistance to the Target Country 
 
Like the EU, also Iran has its allyes that help opposing the sanctions and giving support 
with openening its markets to Iran. The most significant and important allyes are for sure 
China and Russia. Russia, allthough not such a large trading partner of Iran, has an 
important role because of its permament seat in the Security Council. 
 
Both China and Russia have, like the EU, preferred the use of incentives over sanctions and 
a diplomatic approach when it came to Iranian nuclear program. However when incentives 
had no impact they were not willing to take a further step. Russia` s support mainly 
depends on its energy consideration, such as the ensurance that its companies have the 
leading position when it comes to commercial opportunities in Iranian energy sector 
(Taylor, 2010, 86). China as the second largest importer from Iran, mostly of crude oil as 
such does not want to participate in the oil embargo (Mao & Blanchard, 2012). The second 
reason for the opposition to sanctions are the growing economic ties with Iran in the recent 
years, which show that China is benefiting from the withdrawl of Western companies in 
Iran (AFP, 2012). 
 
India is the next country opposing sanctions on Iran. As the second biggest importer of 
Iran’s oil, it has shown reluctance to sanctions imposed on Iran, and it has, similar like 
China prospered from the absence of western companies in Iran. India pays its oil imports 
from Iran with wheat, which does not contribute to the nuclear program (Lakshmanan & 
Narayanan, 2012). India imported 70% of oil consumed, and 10% comes from Iran, 
therefore immediate cut of trade with Iran is certainly not in its interest (Cheema, 2012).  
 
Venezuela, although not a major trade partner, is yet another important country supporting 
Iran. The friendship between Venezuela and Iran has started to grow stronger when the 
sanctions were imposed. Both countries have similar interests in opposing the West and 
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US. Their bilateral trade exceeds $ 40 billion, and Iran has reportedly entered into more 
than 150 energy development, commercial and financial agreements with Venezuela 
(Baitel, 2012). However the most worrying are not the trade relations among these two 
countries, but the military cooperation they are establishing. Venezuela`s president Chavez 
has allowed the Iranians to use Venezuelan territory to mine for uranium, they have also 
offered assistance Iran in development of nuclear technology and in evading UN sanctions 
(Suchlicki, 2012). 
 
Pakistan is Iran`s neighbor, and their support is especially relevant for Iran. Pakistan has 
expressed its opposition toward EU sanctions and showed interest in expanding bilateral 
relations with Iran (Teheran Times, 2012). The country has also emphasized the necessity 
for boosting trade among the D8 (Shia News Association, 2013). D8 is an organization of 
eight developing countries, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Bangladesh 
and Indonesia, that was established for the purpose of economic cooperation among these 
countries (D8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, ND). This group represents 
important channels for Iranian trade when facing EU sanctions. 
 
— Prior Relations between Sender and Target Country 
 
In order to determine the degree of sanctions, we need to evaluate the relations between 
Iran and EU before the conflict. As already analyzed in Chapter III subchapter 1, the 
relations were developing well before the conflict. They started to form a Dialogue in 1995 
and continued with setting up working groups for Energy as well as for Trade and 
Investment, in 1999 Iran became an observer of the Inogate program and a member of 
TRACECA program, they even started to negotiate a comprehensive trade and cooperation 
agreement and a political dialogue agreement in 2001. However all of this stopped in 2005, 
due to the problems with Iran`s nuclear program. Based on this information, we can 
evaluate the relationship between the two countries as neutral. They were not close allies, 
however there was a workable relationship that was moving toward a cooperation before 
the problems appeared.  
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— Political Regime of the Target Country 
 
There are several indicators that show the nature of the political regime of the target 
country. As stated, Iran has a theocratic political system. I will try to revise the main 
characteristics that show why Iran has such a system.  
 
When analyzing the institutionalized competitiveness of political participation, we need to 
see what are the possibilities for alternative preferences for policy and leadership in the 
political arena (Gurr, Marshall & Jaggers, 2011). In Iran we have a clear separation of the 
left, the right and the center that compete for the seats in the Parliament and that represent 
their candidates for the election of president. However there are certain repressions of 
competition that are present in the political arena. As mentioned before, in 1996 
parliamentary elections the Guardian Council banned the participation of nearly all of the 
left coalition members, in 2005 the Guardian Council again made a strict prohibition that 
prohibited women to run for president. All of these regulations were made in the benefit of 
the right coalition that has the support of the Guardian Council. Since the Guardian Council 
is the body that supervises the national elections, its behavior should certainly be less 
subjective. On the presidential election in 2005 as well as 2009, when Ahmadinejad won, 
there was a clear violation when it came to counting the votes. Again the main involved in 
these violations were the Guardian Council and also the Revolutionary Guard Corps that 
took the right to design its own results and ignore the right of popular vote. 
 
The second indicator is the regulation of political participation, and we can say that in Iran 
this is established to a certain degree. There is one identity group that secures central power 
and restricts other competing groups the political activities, until it is displaced in turn 
(Gurr, Marshall & Jaggers, 2011). We can see that there are several political groups in Iran, 
the right, the lest and the centre. Currently the right is ruling the country, with president 
Ahmadinejad taking different illegal measures to keep the right on the leading position in 
the country.  
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The openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment can be defined as almost closed 
in Iran. The chief executive in Iran in the Supreme Leader, and he is appointed by the 
Assembly of Experts. As such he represents a Caesaristic leader which attempts to establish 
the principle of hereditary succession (Gurr, Marshall & Jaggers, 2011). Explained 
differently there is not a system that gives equal chances to several candidates that would 
run for this position, once the Supreme leader is appointed it is usually for a lifetime 
mandate without termination, unless the Assembly dismisses him. 
 
The institutional constrains on the exercise of the executive power, are referring to the 
extent of institutional constrain on the decision making power of the chief executives (Gurr, 
Marshall & Jaggers, 2011). In Iran the chief executives are the Supreme leader, the 
President and the Council of Ministers. The supervisory organs are the Assembly of 
Experts, the Expediency Council and the Guardian Council. Although there is a formally 
established supervision over decision making of executive branch, the Guardian Council 
sides with the conservative right and therefore supports and works together with the 
Supreme leader as well as with the President. The Expediency Council was set up to reduce 
the power of conservatives in the Guardian Council, but since the members are appointed 
by the Supreme leader that also sides with conservatives, it is questionable how objective is 
their role. In the same way the Assembly of Experts is an elected body, however again the 
Guardian Council has to approve all the candidates.  
 
2.1.2. Economic variables 
 
— The size of the sender and target country 
 
The relative size and GDP of the sender is usually bigger than the one from the target.The 
sender, in our case the EU, had in 2011 a GDP of $ 15, 48 trillion (CIA, 2013) as the target 
country, in our case Iran, had in 2011 a GDP of $990, 8 billion (CIA, 2012). By the size the 
difference is also big, size the EU is 4, 324, 782 sq km and is less than one half size of the 
US (CIA, 2013) and on the other side Iran as the 18 largest country in the world with 1, 
648, 195 sq km (CIA, 2012).  
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—The trade linkages 
 
Sender country is usually a very large trade partner, as it is also in our case. As already 
mentioned, EU is an important import and export partner of Iran, and the termination of 
trade does leave consequences for Iran. EU was the second major importer and the first 
export partner of Iran in 2011. 
 
— The types of sanctions used 
 
The type of sanctions that the EU used were economic sanctions, more specific they used 
trade sanction, financial sanctions and asset freezes. EU and UN also used the new concept 
in economic sanction, called smart sanctions, by using asset freeze and travel bans for 
entities and individual connected with the illegal nuclear activities in Iran, and this way 
they targeted sanctions in order not to influence the innocent. The sanctions imposed were 
in certain measures unilateral and in certain multilateral. EU has imposed sanctions by UN 
Security Council that are multilateral as well as imposed additional measures that are its 
own decision and imply only to trade between EU and Iran. If talking about the type of 
sanctions we can also say that the sanctions imposed are negative sanctions, since they 
include measures such as embargo, boycott, blacklist, freezing assets.  
 
— The economic health and political stability of target country  
 
Economic health in Iran has been throughout the history a problematic factor in the 
country. In Rafsanjani period, in Khatami period and especially in Ahmadinejad period 
economic problems disrupt the functioning of the state. The main problem is the high 
dependency on oil. As already mentioned 80% of Iran`s foreign income comes from trade 
and the rest comes from taxes. This makes their economy very dependent on the prices of 
oil as well as o the trade partners that buy oil. The second problem is the high inflation that 
the state is facing. As Ahmadinejad decided to block foreign investments and impose 
isolationist measures, as well as started uncontrolled spending, the consequences were a 
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high inflation. Iran also experiences chronic unemployment, since the unemployment rate 
between 1987 and 2010 averaged on 13 percent (Grammy, 2011). The political stability can 
according to the economic situation also be questionable. Although the right coalition has a 
very strong position in the country, having a majority in most the state bodies, the 
economic situation in the country brings great discontent among the people. The 
Ahmadinejad regime is known by its repression and hard rule, therefore there is probably 
fear of rebellion, however when the situation gets extremely bad the country is known by 
its big protests, such as in the time of revolution.  
 
Therefore the evaluation of the economic health and political stability in the country 
according to the scale introduced in the first chapter is that the country has significant 
problems, since it has severe economic problems, as well as substantial internal dissent. 
 
— The estimating costs of sanctions to the target country 
 
In Chapter II, we mentioned that the main problem of Iran`s GDP in the high dependence 
on oil and very low non-oil growth. The costs that were caused by EU sanctions to Iran will 
be measured with the change in its GDP. Due to the drop in trade, GDP has been estimated 
to decrease, according to IMF, 0, 9% in 2012 (Policy Analysis Unit, 2012). According to 
Economist Intelligence Unit, it is estimated a drop of GDP for 1, 2% further on in 2013 
(Cordesman et. al, 2012). Since the last value of Iran`s GDP, in 2011, has been estimated 
on $ 474, 7 billion (CIA, 2012), we can estimate that the drop and therefore also the cost of 
sanctions for Iran will be, in 2012, approximately $ 4, 46 billion and possibly in 2013 it can 
rise up to approximately $ 5, 95 billion. A challenging financial consequence of sanctions 
in also high inflation, the national currency has lost 40 percent of its value against dollar 
(Kanter, 2012).  
 
2.1.3. Assessment of efficiency of sanctions 
 
The goal of the imposed sanctions was to impair the target country`s military potential. 
According to the analyses of variables we can evaluate if the political and economic costs 
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to Iran from sanctions are greater that the political and security costs of complying with the 
EU`s demands. It means that the costs for the target country have to be greater if it defies 
sanctions than if it complies with them, in order for sanctions to be efficient (Hufbauer et 
al., 2009, 50). 
 
The political costs that the sanctions bring to Iran, can according to the variables be the lost 
of good relations with certain important states such as Japan, UAE, South Korea and to 
some amount also Turkey. The political costs are also the lost relations with EU that were 
developing toward a trade and cooperation agreement. However since Iran is a theocracy 
and is ruled by conservatives as well as by a radical president, who both have an interest for 
militarization of Iranian nuclear program, perhaps loosing good political relations is not the 
main concern of the country. They have on their side two very important countries such as 
China and Russia that have a similar view on the nuclear weapons, and that have a lot of 
influence on the decisions in the Security Council. Such partnerships give Iran a lot of 
incentives for a further development of their nuclear weapons program. Economic sanctions 
can never be universal, since there are always countries that side with the target. There is 
also no fear that EU would use companion policy measures that would cause political or 
security costs to Iran. As an old advocate of diplomacy over sanctions, it has changed its 
stand a bit by imposing economic sanctions after several diplomatic attempts failed. 
However it is not in the interest or the nature of EU to use any military measures with the 
country such as Iran, because it would bring further risks that could endanger the whole 
international community. The only country that could perhaps persuade them in 
cooperating in such measures would be the US.  
 
First one of economic costs for the sender would be the loss of the trade linkages. They had 
a very well developed trade among EU and Iran and among individual members of EU and 
Iran. EU certainly is a large market of 27 states that is hard to replace, however as already 
mentioned there are other countries willing to work with Iran such as Pakistan, that has in 
2012 signed a deal to supply wheat to Iran in exchange for electricity and petroleum 
products (Hussain, 2012); such as Turkey, who supposedly cooperates with EU, however 
also became third largest trade partner in 2012 (Press TV, 2012b); and others who are not 
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intimidated by EU sanctions and US extraterritorial sanctions, or those who find other 
channels of trade with Iran.  The type of sanctions that were used by the EU, the economic 
sanctions, are not really efficient for a system where the elites rule the country and don`t 
provide much for the citizens. Although EU imposed smart sanctions that target the 
members of elites and their fortune, the other part of sanctions that bans the trade in certain 
sectors of goods influences on the whole economy in Iran and therefore also the innocent 
people that have to face consequential high unemployment and inflation. Economic health 
has been a problem of Iran for decades however it has managed to cope without any foreign 
help or intervention. Therefore it is questionable how much will some economic damage 
caused by the sanctions really affect them since this is something they are used to dealing 
with. There are also observers that state, the economic problems are not only the 
consequence of economic sanctions but mostly the result of Ahmadinejad economic 
policies (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2012). Iran can, as already mentioned, 
certainly find other trade partners that will improve the economic health of the country. 
Russia, China and India are all major gold produces, and in case trading with currencies 
get`s too complicated it can be replaced with trading oil for gold, which has always 
represented a good alternative for money (Katusa, 2012). As for the political stability, there 
is a very strong position of the right coalition in the country that rule with a strict hand over 
the people. This is a country that formally has an elected president, and in reality it has 
arranged elections that are controlled by the elite of the country. The stability of these elite 
is perhaps too strong to be changed by the protests and discontent of the ordinary people. 
The protests that have emerged so far were not on a scale large enough to threaten the 
stability of regime, which could be the evidence of the unwillingness of the Iranian people 
to engage in another protest, as well as disappointment that the protests have brought in 
2009, after the reelection of Ahmadinejad (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 
2012). The costs that are caused to Iran by imposing sanctions are certainly high, and 
already do and will cause trouble. However the sectors that are sanctioned, such as crude 
oil, petrochemical products, natural gas, are all goods that are highly needed in the world, 
and there will always be a country that will be willing to take the risk and buy the goods 
from Iran, possibly getting them at a lower price considering Iran`s situation. Iran also finds 
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other paths to trade with Europe, such as through Turkey, which is certainly not in favor of 
EU.  
 
The security costs for Iran, if it would comply with the demands, are the greatest since it 
means a loss of a nuclear weapons program which would potentially take away the chance 
of becoming the leading country in the region. The security dimension is the main reason 
why Iran refuses to comply with the demands of EU. It`s main opponents such as the US 
and Israel posses a nuclear weapon, as well as allies such as Pakistan, North Korea, India, 
China, Russia (Kimball, 2012), therefore it is difficult to expect that Iran would give up its 
opportunity to build one itself and not become a member of the nuclear club. The resistance 
to all the sanctions shows that it is their main priority to develop a nuclear weapon.  
 
Basing on the variables analyzed we can conclude that complying with the EU demands 
would cause, in Iran`s perspective, more costs than non-compliance with them. We can 
justify this by looking at the main interest of the target country. Iran`s main interest has 
been, ever since they have started a nuclear program, to develop a nuclear weapon. They 
have covered that from international community because they were aware that most 
countries would oppose such actions. There have been several attempts and offers that 
would help Iran economically improve its situation in exchange for the termination of the 
uranium enrichment program, one of them was for example the offer made by P5+1 that 
included cooperation in the fields of aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, and 
agriculture and other areas between Iran, EU and US (Davenport, 2012a). However Iran 
refused, which clearly indicates its higher interest over their security dimension. Nuclear 
weapons are a symbol of power which Iran certainly wants, in order to be able to counter 
the West. 
 
The political and economic costs are not as significant to Iran, which has been seen over 
numerous negotiations, threats and finally economic sanctions that have been imposed to 
terminate the illegal nuclear activities in Iran, however without success and efficiency. The 
main reason for inefficiency of the measures taken is not that the measures were not 
targeted in the right directions. They were, and they included all the sectors in which EU is 
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a crucial and important partner for Iran, and that certainly will leave an impact on the 
country’s economy. The main problem lies in the interests of the ruling elite in Iran that 
does not give up under economic pressures, because their main interest is militarization of 
their nuclear program with which they could show their power to the international 
community, and also ensure the state`s security against a military attack. 
 
2.2.  Consequences of economic sanctions for the EU  
 
— Consequences for individual EU members  
 
From individual members, most affected will certainly be the countries importing most 
crude oil from Iran. Those are: Greece, Spain and Italy. Those are also the countries that 
face the greatest economic crises in the EU. Their financial situation might make it difficult 
to find a new crude oil supplier, since they are not the most reliable in payments due to 
their financial problems as well as have many other problems they have to solve parallel to 
this one. 
 
Greece is drastically challenged in the EU, by the ban on crude oil trade with Iran. The 
Hellenic Petroleum refinery, which is the biggest Greek refinery, has been denied crude oil 
by Iran, due to non-payment because EU banks refused to facilitate payments, as a result of 
financial sanctions (Payne & Farge, 2012). Finding new trade partners for a country with 
significant financial trouble could be much harder than making a deal with a long-term 
trade partner. Iran was the one country that was selling Greece its oil for credit, which 
means they were able to pay for shipments later. Other oil suppliers want credit drawn from 
foreign banks, not Greek ones, because of the risk of the latter collapsing. This also means 
that Greece will have to make a prepayment for oil, which can bring great trouble to cash-
flow of refineries due to the large quantities of imported oil per day (Birnbaum, 2012). Iran 
has, after the EU imposed sanctions in January 2012, threatened to immediately stop crude 
oil supply to Greece, which is highly dependent on imports from Iran (Birnbaum, 2012). 
This has brought great psychological pressure and insecurity into a country that already 
faces major domestic problems. EU was aware of the situation Greece is facing after the 
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sanctions come into force and has therefore agreed that the cutoff happens later in July 
2012. However Iran has, as revenge against EU measures, stooped the crude oil exports to 
Greece already in April (Karimi, 2012). Since April 2012, Greece had to rely on oil from 
sources such as Libya, Russia and Iraq (Kent & Gross, 2012). Greece was given the 
opportunity to replace the imports from Iran, with the imports from Russia and Saudi 
Arabia. The main problem however is that Greece already imports 46 percent of its supplies 
from Russia (Athens News, 2012), and a high dependence on crude oil from only one 
country can again bring new risks, especially if that country is Russia which was already 
seen as unreliable partner in the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crises, when gas supplies to 
EU were temporary stopped (Westphal, 2009). There are parts of Greece, such as Kastoria, 
where people cannot afford to have heating due to the bad economic situation they are 
facing and the high prices of oil (Staley, 2012). Blocking imports from Iran makes the 
prices of oil even higher, and the situation for Greek economy even worse than it already is.  
 
Italy is the country that was estimated to suffer most from the EU embargo on Iranian oil, 
as Italy and Iran have always been close business partners as well as because Italy depends 
heavily on the supplies of crude oil from Iran and because it is heavily affected by the 
economic crises (Press TV, 2012a). The Italian refineries have made arrangements to 
import crude oil from Russia, in order to substitute the Iranian supply (Bias, 2012). 
Contracts with Saudi Arabia are also considered a solution however the problem appears 
for smaller refineries, since Saudi Arabia wants signing up contracts for fixed periods 
(Kurahone & Dinati, 2012). Italy is also highly depended on crude oil from Libya, which 
has recently faced a civil war and is perhaps also not the most reliable partner, since new 
disputes may emerge and also the prices of oil from Libya remain quite high because of the 
war. Russia and Saudi Arabia each separately amounted for around 15% of Italian crude oil 
imports in the first quarter of 2012 (Kovalyova, 2012), which indicates again a high 
dependence on imports from limited number of countries. As already mentioned, high 
dependence on only few sources can bring new uncertainties and trouble. Italian companies 
have a well established presence in Iran, and the sanctions may cause the end of a 
longstanding trade relations and replacement with Turkish and Chinese companies, that will 
be happy to gain new trade connections. It has been estimated, that complying with EU 
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sanctions will cost Italians 30 000 jobs (Press TV, 2012a). This may have very drastic 
consequences for a country where the unemployment was already high at 11, 2 percent in 
the end of 2012 (Fontes, 2013). Italian company Edison International had to withdraw from 
Iran`s contract to explore Iran`s Dayyer natural gas field (Nuland, 2012), which indicates 
EU sanctions inflict also on research activities, which is certainly not good for future 
development on energy field. The company Eni has had an established trade relation with 
Iran ever since 1950s, and they suddenly had to terminate it. People in Italy already face 
significant economic problems with a weak euro and higher taxes, and the prices of oil that 
have already raised since sanctions were imposed cause even more problems, especially for 
citizens dependant on car transport. Experts also warn that if prices of oil in Italy remain so 
high they could face an inflationary depression (Vassari & Ebhardt, 2012). 
 
Spain imports almost all the oil it consumes for its energy and manufacturing sectors. The 
country has imported great amounts from Libya, however after the civil war it has started to 
supplement the oil imports from Libya with Iranian crude oil. Therefore sanctions on Iran 
represent a great threat to the Spanish energy sector, which is 80% dependant on imports 
(Comas, 2012). Spain is turning to South America for new oil imports. They started to 
import crude oil from Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela (Davies, 2012). However these 
new partners represent still a new trade link which has no guarantees for a long-term 
commitment. Especially Venezuela can be a very unstable partner. Although Spain brings 
economic benefits for the country, Venezuela also has a very close and strategic relation 
with Iran, and in case Iran has something against the exports to Spain, Venezuela will 
certainly be more interested in remaining friendly relations with Iran than keeping Spain as 
an export country for crude oil. The problem that Spain faces is also the prices of oil, that 
have started rising even before the sanctions were imposed and have continued to rise even 
more after the sanctions. If the economic health of the country would be normal, a rise of 
oil prices would not represent such a problem. However as Spain is close to a second 
recession, the unemployment is at 22, 8 percent, the rise of the price of oil can represent 
catastrophic consequences. Spain has reduced the speed limit from 120km/h, to 110km/h, 
in order to lower the oil costs. Prices may become so high that citizens won`t be able to 
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afford gas (RT, 2012b). Spain is one of the three countries that have been sacrificed for the 
sanctions on Iran.  
 
Belgium is the fourth EU country most dependant on oil from Iran. However if we look at 
articles and reports in newspapers and other sources we can notice that there are not many 
news on bad consequences that Belgium might face due to lack of oil from Iran. At least 
not as much as about Italy, Greece and Spain. This can tell us that although Belgium might 
face some consequences, they will be much less obvious as in other three countries due to a 
much better economic situation in this country. As mentioned before, if a country has good 
economic health, rise of oil prices does not represent such a significant problem. Since it 
has a stronger economic position it is also much easier to find new trade partners for crude 
oil. 
 
There are also several common problems that all EU countries importing oil from Iran have 
to face. The first fear is that as more countries stop importing oil from Iran, the demand for 
oil from Saudi Arabia will increase, forcing them to use its spare capacity. After the Libya 
war, Saudi Arabia made no production response to the loss of Libyan oil. It took them 4-5 
months to increase production (Mcdonald, 2012), which can be concerning for the countries 
counting on oil from this country. There are not only European countries relying on oil 
imports from Saudi Arabia, but also Turkey and Japan. The second concern is the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which all the oil travels to the main importers. Iran has been making 
constant threats to close it, and block the passing of exports to Asia, EU and US. There are 
other routes available however this would mean delays and higher costs. Closing the Strait 
would also cause a high increase in the prices of oil (Tverberg, 2012). The third problem is 
the fact that oil embargo on Iran has influenced also on the prices of oil. The lack of oil and 
the insecurity about finding new trade partners pushed prices higher. The prices have grown 
more than 9 percent for August 2012 delivery, which was the biggest one day oil-rise in 
percentage terms since 2009 (Press TV, 2012c). The decision to stop dealing with Iran`s 
central bank is also influencing on the rise of prices (Atwi, 2012). 
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The three countries, UK, France and Germany, are not as much dependant on oil from Iran 
however they do have a well established economic relations with Iran that suffers. Germany 
export dependant entrepreneurs fear that if they cut ties with Iran, they are out for the next 
generation, because Malaysian, South Korean and Chinese rivals will take their place on 
the market. It has already been noticed, that while major firms such as Siemens and 
Daimler are stepping away from the market, due to pressure from the sanctions, there are 
their subcontractors and suppliers that are already making side deals with Iranian 
companies (Daragahi, 2010). The bilateral trade among the two countries dropped for 19 
percent in 2011, due to EU sanctions (Federal Foreign Office, 2012b). As mentioned, 
Iranian market is important for Germany because there is no competition from the US. 
Loosing such a market, also for a strong country such as Germany, is certainly not positive 
for its economy in times of economic crises.  
 
French auto-manufacturing group Peugeot Citroën had to stop the production in one of its 
factories in France due to lack of spare parts that are produced in Iran. The consequence 
was the lay off by 220 workers (Arutz, 2012). This shows what is the direction in which the 
EU sanctions are leading domestic companies and hurting their production and 
employment. It influences innocent people in a time of economic crises where many people 
struggle to keep their jobs. The French Total group is specialized in oil and gas exploration 
and production also suffers from the lost of Iranian market. Iran as a country with large oil 
and gas reserves offers many opportunities for investment and research that had to be 
canceled. Asian countries are likely to take their place, and even if sanctions will be lifted, 
the opportunities will already be taken. 
 
The UK has also been facing a large decrease in trade with Iran and is losing manufacturing 
and trade relationship. There are small companies that produce widgets that have nothing to 
do with bombs but they are caught by sanctions, which have caused collapse of several 
such small companies (Sultan, 2012). The Iranian population is young and there is a high 
demand for foreign goods, which offers a dynamic market for imports into the country 
(Global Trade, ND).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the first part of this dissertation I have researched the effectiveness of EU sanctions on 
Iran, and the discoveries that this research brought me to, give us several findings. The 
political and economic variables, which represented a tool for research and helped discover 
more about the possibility of the efficiency of EU sanctions on Iran, have shown results that 
enabled me to find the answer to the first hypothesis of this dissertation. Iran is a country 
with a significant interest in developing a nuclear weapon. The fact that the international 
community is against such activities and tries to prevent them from having one, makes Iran 
want it even more. Iran is a loner in the international community and shares common 
positions only with few other countries. Iran also wants to be competitive with other 
countries in the military field. They are aware that in the economic sphere they are behind 
the West, and they probably need much more time to develop a transparent environment for 
trade. Or perhaps that is not even something they are interested in, since the elites are the 
ones ruling the country and imposing isolationistic measures. However state economy is 
not as big a concern as foreign military assets endangering their sovereignty and security as 
a state. The absence of a nuclear weapon in an environment where their main enemies such 
as the US and Israel, posses nuclear weapon and constantly threaten with attack, is certainly 
more disturbing for Iran than its economic condition. Politically and economically it has the 
support from some big and influential countries, such as China, Russia, Venezuela and 
India. Economically it will lose some important export markets such as EU, Japan, South 
Korea, however it will surely find new partners or other channels to do trade. Security costs 
however would mean the loss of an opportunity to possess a nuclear weapon, which is 
something a conflicting, individualistic and closed country such as Iran would never settle 
for.  
 
According to these findings I can accept the first thesis of the dissertation:  The political 
and economic costs for Iran, caused by EU sanctions will in fact not be greater than the 
political and security costs of complying with the EU`s demands and therefore the 
sanctions will not be efficient, is true, since they give such a great importance to their 
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nuclear weapons program, that additional economic problems can not persuade them to 
stop it. 
 
In a theocracy, with a president such as Ahmadinejad, that shows no interest in cooperation 
with international community, is not intimidated by sanctions, and the strict measures don`t 
stop his ambitions to build nuclear weapon, the only solution, according to some experts, 
that would make sanctions efficient would be the change of incentives and capabilities 
within the country so that more acceptable leaders can win power (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 
52). This has shown in the past as very challenging especially because of repression and 
corruption of the Guardian Council. The change of the ruling elite in Iran is an almost 
impossible process. With a formally established system of elections, there are prohibitions 
and violations by the Guardian Council, such as ban of left candidates and cheating with 
counting of the votes that make the system difficult to influence and introduce a change 
into it. 
 
What the sanctions are currently bringing for Iran is economic trouble, to an economy that 
already had difficulties before. However this has not convinced Iran to stop with the 
nuclear weapon development, it has only stimulated them to oppose more and show their 
ability to develop a nuclear weapon despite the opposition of the EU and rest of 
international community.  
 
The other part of the dissertation was focused on finding the answer to the second 
hypothesis and its research questions. I was researching the influence that the EU sanctions 
have on individual member states that have a trade relation with Iran as well as on other 
relevant countries in international community. The gathered information have shown that 
the most affected will be the countries already facing severe trouble from the global 
economic crises. These countries are Greece, Italy and Spain. All the three countries are 
major importers of Iranian oil, and the dependence on oil from Iran causes great trouble 
considering the ban on oil imports from Iran that the EU sanctions demand. The main 
problem that makes it hard to find new suppliers of oil for the three countries is especially 
their economic situation. Their big financial trouble might make it difficult to find new 
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trade partners that would trust their credibility. This is especially difficult for Greece, 
because it had special credit arrangements with Iran, which enabled Greece to pay for oil 
later.  Loosing Iran, Greece and Italy decided to increase imports from Russia, which is 
already supplying most of its oil. Depending too much on one or few countries can bring 
further risks and threaten energy supplies. Italy is also the one country that will suffer most 
from eliminating Iran as a trade partner. Italy is not only highly dependent on Iranian oil, 
but also has a very well established trade cooperation with this country. Several companies 
had to terminate trade relations causing further damage to Italian economic situation. Spain 
has supplemented most of its crude oil coming from Libya with Iranian oil, due to the civil 
war in Libya. Now they are once again in a very short period of time faced with a search for 
a new replacement. All three countries are also under psychological pressure and insecurity 
that makes the bad atmosphere and stability in these countries even worse. In all three 
countries the oil embargo and the consequential rise of prices influenced directly the 
citizens. In Greece, people cannot afford to buy oil for heating, in Italy and Spain people 
are faced with extremely high prices gas for cars. EU imposed smart sanctions on Iran, in 
order not to hurt the innocent citizens in Iran. However it seems like they forgot about their 
own citizens that are faced with several consequences that such measures bring. The main 
problem that all the crude oil importing countries are facing is the increase in prices. In 
economically affected countries that are faced with slow economic growth, high oil prices 
lead to recession. Worsening the situation in countries like Greece, Spain and Italy further 
endangers the stability of the whole EU and its financial stability. As the imports from Iran 
for the whole EU represent only 0, 9 % of total share of imports, and the exports to Iran 
only 0, 7% of the total share of exports, it may seem that it is not so harmful to stop trade 
relations with this country. However the dependence of individual EU countries on import 
and export trade with Iran shows a different perspective on such a decision. 
 
The second half are the EU countries that do not so much rely on oil imports from Iran, but 
have a significant and important trade relations with this country, that will be affected by 
the sanctions. These countries are Germany, UK, France and as mentioned also Italy. 
Although these countries, with the exception of Italy, are the strongest countries in EU, 
losing a market such as Iran is certainly not in favor of their economies. The main problem 
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that all the companies from these countries doing business woth Iran are aware of, is that 
leaving Iranian market means that the trade connections they have established there will be 
lost forever. Chinese, Malaysian and South Korean companies would very fast replace the 
European companies in this strategically important country. Therefore even if sanctions 
will be lifted all the opportunities will already be taken.  
 
Other relevant countries, the ones cooperating with EU or Iran, will also feel the influence 
of sanctions, some positive and most negative. Among the countries that will benefit from 
sanctions we can certainly find other oil produces, especially Saudi Arabia and Russia. 
Most EU and also other countries have turned to Saudi Arabia and Russia to substitute the 
lost Iranian oil. This will have a positive impact on the income for these two countries. This 
will also potentially bring closer cooperation among oil importing countries and other oil 
producers. Asian counties will benefit also from the new space on the market after the EU 
countries stop their business in Iran. They will be given new opportunities to take a place in 
the Iranian market. The countries that continue to do business with Iran, such as China and 
India, can negotiate lower prices of oil, considering Iran`s economic isolation. 
 
The relevant countries cooperating with EU will have to face some similar problems as EU 
members. They will have to find new oil suppliers and the trade with Iran will be more 
difficult. The loss of oil production from Iran will cause higher oil prices for the whole 
world. Turkey is faced with an awkward position, somewhere in between EU and Iran and 
is trying to benefit from cooperating with both sides in different ways. Certain other 
insecurities may occur. As EU imposes stricter sanctions, Iran threatens to close the Strait 
of Hormuz, which is the main road for all the oil supply and other trade for Asia, EU and 
the US. Since many countries turn to Saudi Arabia for oil supply, Saudi Arabia is under a 
lot of pressure as it has to increase its oil production in order to ensure the supply. If 
something goes wrong and Saudi Arabia would not be able to produce the amounts of oil 
needed, a lot of countries depending on it would be in trouble. Another consequence of EU 
sanctions on Iran is also closer ties among countries that oppose the West. Iran has been 
working in close cooperation with Venezuela, China, Russia and India, all very strong 
countries and all against the Western sanctions on Iran. They have also been supplying Iran 
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with material for its nuclear program. Such alliances can certainly bring worries to the 
international community.  
 
According to this information we can conclude an answer to the second hypothesis and its 
research questions. The consequences that the EU sanctions bring to certain individual 
members, especially to the weakest ones, are certainly not in their benefit. They have 
brought many difficulties for economies of EU countries, mostly also because the strongest 
sanctions were imposed after 2010, when the EU was already deeply in financial crises. 
There were several years of diplomatic negotiations that brought no conclusions and only 
showed that Iran is most of the time playing with the West by giving them agreements and 
promises that were very soon breached. Iran saw that even though they do not cooperate 
there are no drastic consequences. If the economic sanctions would be imposed sooner, 
perhaps before the big financial crises, they would be less harmful for EU, because EU 
members would easier adapt to the new situation and deal with higher oil prices. The EU 
officials are taking strict measures in times when they should be helping member 
economies and not further limiting them. There was too much time left for diplomatic 
measures before the economic sanctions were imposed. 
 
The imposition of EU sanctions seems to be doing more damage to its own members as it 
does to Iran. Basing on my research I can partly accept and partly reject my hypothesis: EU 
economic sanctions on Iran bring additional difficulties and insecurities for EU members 
as well as for other countries in the international community, because they were set up in 
the wrong time period. The research enables me to accept the statement that the sanctions 
on Iran bring additional difficulties and insecurities for EU members, because they were set 
up in a time when financial crisis in EU is at its peak, especially in the countries that are 
most dependent on Iranian oil. However they do not influence in such a way on all of the 
other countries in the international community. Certainly they will influence the countries 
siding with the EU that will have to find new trade partners and face higher oil prices. But 
the oil producing countries will certainly benefit. For the countries siding with Iran, 
sanctions will bring a strategic cooperation and for countries that continue to trade with 
Iran, sanctions will bring new place for them on the Iranian market. Therefore I can reject 
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that the EU sanctions will bring additional difficulties and insecurities for all other 
countries in international community, but only to some of them.  
 
If we connect the conclusions that the research of the two hypotheses gives us, we can see 
that the sanctions bring few possibilities for success, mostly because of Iran`s regime and 
its interests as well the fact that it is impossible to impose such sanctions in times of global 
economic crises and expect not to damage EU members. In order to change the situation, 
Iran would have to be persuaded to care more about its economic situation than it does over 
its military security. This would save both problems, stop Iran`s development of a nuclear 
weapon as well as terminate the sanctions and reestablish the trade relations with Iran 
which would give EU members more economic stability. Perhaps question that can lead to 
further research is weather Iranian regime can be changed without a military intervention? 
The new presidential elections are coming in June 2013, and Ahmadinejad cannot run for 
president anymore, because he already served two terms. Can the left find a strong 
candidate and manages to stop the corrupt apparatus of the Guardian Council that violates 
the right of a popular vote? Although the left is more in favor of cooperation with the West, 
would they really agree on a non-nuclear Iran? Perhaps even an extremist country as Iran 
realizes that using a nuclear weapon would have a devastating influence also on its own 
country, and if everyone would stop putting such importance on the arms race, even Iran 
would lose such a strong interest in possessing a nuclear weapon.  
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